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The promotion and protection of human rights is one
of the primordial objectives of the foreign policy of the
European Union – and thus of the European Security
and Defence Policy (ESDP). It is a guiding principle for
military operations of the European Union; and with
the strengthening of civil-military co-operation and the
development of purely civil instruments for crisis mana-
gement human rights protection should and will rise in
importance for crisis management operations of the
European Union.
The present study examines the role human rights pro-
tection plays today in ESDP operations. It comes to the
conclusion that from a normative perspective, a solid
set of human rights rules and guidelines for ESDP have
been developed. In practice, though, the integration of
Preface
human rights components or human rights advisors as
well as gender advisors in the ESDP missions has only
just begun. The authors consider the strengthening of
the civil component and the integration of a human
rights perspective into the planning, as well as of hu-
man rights protection into the implementation funda-
mental steps for a lasting, sustainable impact of EU
missions in conflict regions. The study concludes with
a set of recommendations for strengthening human
rights as an element of the ESDP.
Dr. Heiner Bielefeldt
Director 
German Institute for Human Rights
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Crisis management operations have, as the most re-
cent European Union (EU) mission in the DR Congo,
EUFOR RD Congo, illustrates, emerged as one of the
key instruments of the international community for
mastering a development associated with so-called
fragile or failed states. Fragile statehood, which has
afflicted the international system increasingly since
the ending of the east-west confrontation, is perceived
as a security risk that reaches beyond the borders of the
state in question.2 This risk, the dangers associated
with it and the will to “contribute to the protection of
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” in-
creasingly provoke international organisations and re-
gional actors like the UN and the EU to react with mea-
sures such as civilian or military operations.3
Multi-dimensional peace operations are nowadays not
only conducted by the UN, but also involve regional
actors such as the OSCE, NATO or the EU, which as a
union of 27 states with approximately 500 million peo-
ple has become a key player in world affairs. Only a
few years ago it seemed extremely unlikely that the
European Union would carry out such operations.
Meanwhile, though, as well as applying a large range
of tools such as trade, development, sanctions, hu-
manitarian aid or diplomacy to prevent or mitigate cri-
sis situations, the Union has been involved in 16 dif-
ferent field operations. These operations come under
the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP),4
which constitutes a vital part of the Union’s Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that came into force
in 1993 with the Maastricht Treaty.
The ESDP became a reality on the ground in 2003, when
two civilian and two military operations were launched
to facilitate the stabilisation of two regions in crisis,
South-East Europe and the Democratic Republic of
Congo. Today, the European Union has launched 16
operations altogether, most of which are ongoing. The
missions have developed enormously over the past five
years, changing in shape and growing in importance. 
This study examines the human rights dimensions of
ESDP missions. As acknowledged by the Council of the
EU,5 every crisis includes human rights violations, and
consequently human rights protection has to be part of
every solution. Article 11 of the Treaty on European
Union (TEU) affirms the EU’s commitment to human
rights as a guiding objective for its foreign and secu-
rity policy. Recent developments such as the adoption
by the Council of guidelines on human rights and gen-
der mainstreaming in ESDP crisis management have
underlined this commitment even more strongly.
All missions have been inevitably confronted with hu-
man rights issues, such as the question of dealing with
child soldiers, the discovery of mass graves in a war-
torn region or the issue of the appropriate use of force
and rules of behaviour. This study endeavours to ex-
Introduction
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1 Kofi Annan: Address to the Summit of the African Union, Sirte, 4 July 2005.
2 See Schneckener (2005a), 26–29.
3 Quote from: United Nation Security Council Resolution S/RES/1671 (2006), mandating EUFOR DR Congo, adopted by the 
Security Council at its 5421st meeting on 25 April 2006, Introduction.
4 As enshrined in Art. 17.2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU).
5 See Council of the European Union 11678/1/05 REV1, Aceh Monitoring Mission – Human Rights Aspects. Brussels, 
21 February 2006 (CEU 11678/1/05 REV1).
“We will not enjoy development without security, 
we will not enjoy security without development, 
and we will not enjoy either without respect 
for human rights.” K O F I A N N A N 1
plore to what extent human rights issues have thus
far been integrated into EU crisis management opera-
tions and draws some conclusions for the further im-
plementation of human rights standards in ESDP mis-
sions. It does not, however, examine the reasons behind
the EU’s decision to launch an operation in a given
country, which could be a question of the legitimacy,
the timeliness or the adequacy of an operation as an
answer to a crisis.
After an introduction to the ESDP and its crisis man-
agement capabilities, the study gives an overview of
the main bodies involved in decision making and at
the operational level within European Security and De-
fence Policy. It then examines human rights obliga-
tions relevant for the ESDP. Subsequently, human rights
tasks which can be carried out in crisis management
operations are described followed by an account of the
human rights components within the military and ci-
vilian ESDP operations. The focus is on the principal
implicit or explicit human rights function of each mis-
sion, introduced by a brief overview of the various types
of missions undertaken by the EU. In the final chapter
opportunities for strengthening human rights in the
ESDP are sketched out.
As regards the methodology, this study is mainly based
on a number of expert interviews and an analysis of
Council documents, press releases and academic litera-
ture.
Introduction
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1.1 The Development of the European
Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)
Established as the second pillar of the EU in 1993 in the
Treaty on European Union (TEU) (Maastricht) and defined
in Article 11.1, the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) on EU aims at safeguarding common values of
the Union, strengthening the security of the Union and
international security and developing key values such
as democracy, the rule of law and human rights. The
CFSP underwent important changes in the Amsterdam
Treaty and the provisions effective today were revised
again by the Treaty of Nice, which entered into force on
1 February 2003. The main features of the CFSP are
outlined in Art. 17.1 and 2 of the TEU and read now in
the amended version: 
1. The common foreign and security policy shall in-
clude all questions relating to the security of the
Union, including the progressive framing of a com-
mon defence policy, which might lead to a common
defence, should the European Council so decide. […]
2. Questions referred to in this Article shall include hu-
manitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, in-
cluding peacemaking.
Art. 17.2 describes the kind of missions assigned to the
EU, the so-called Petersberg tasks.6 The three types of
missions envisaged in Petersberg cover a range of pos-
sible measures, from humanitarian aid and rescue tasks
to peacebuilding and ultimately to robust military
peacemaking operations within the field of crisis mana-
gement. Apart from conflict prevention, these tasks
cover the fields of military and civil crisis management,
both under the heading of ESDP. 
A common defence policy was created by the TEU
(Maastricht) in Title V Art. J.4 with the more cautious
formulation stating that CFSP “shall include all ques-
tions related to the security of the Union, including
the eventual framing of a common defence policy …”
(italics added). 
The ESDP as the operative part of the CFSP was shaped
in a series of Council meetings from 1999 on. In 1999
– the enormous speed with which decisions were tak-
en is to be understood against the backdrop of the
Balkan conflict and the striking inability of the Euro-
peans to take decisive action – the project of develop-
ing an independent ESDP as a distinct part of the EU’s
CFSP was launched by the Cologne European Council.7
This meeting placed the development of civilian and
military capabilities for international conflict preven-
tion and crisis management at the core of the process
of strengthening the ESDP in order to meet the ESDP’s
overall objective: the strengthening of the EU’s capa-
city for external action. At the Nice summit in 2000
many important features were finally adopted or cre-
ated, such as the post of the High Representative for
the CFSP (who is also the Secretary-General of the
Council of the European Union; HR/SG), the Political
and Security Committee, the European Military Com-
mittee and the European Military Staff. Since then ope-
rational activity has continued to expand. When the
European Council at Laeken in December 2001 adopted
a declaration on the operational capability of the ESDP,
The ESDP Crisis Management Operations of the EU – Human Rights Included?
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6 The tasks derived from a June 1992 Declaration of the Western European Union at Petersberg, Germany, and were incorporated
in 1999 into Title V of the TEU.
7 See Cologne European Council, 150/99 REV 1, Presidency Conclusions, Annex III, European Council Declaration on Strengthening
the Common European Policy on Security and Defence, 3 / 4 June 1999. 
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it officially recognised that the Union is now capable
of conducting a wide range of civilian and military crisis
management operations “with tasks ranging from
peacekeeping and monitoring implementation of a
peace process to advice and assistance in military, po-
lice, border monitoring and rule of law sectors”.8
“Establishing the rule of law and protecting human
rights” in connection with other civil instruments “are
the best means of strengthening the international or-
der” according to the European Security Strategy “A
Secure Europe in a Better World” (ESS), adopted on 12
December 2003. In this strategy the EU’s commitment
to human rights was developed further, while the EU
also took a major step towards strategic development
in the security field. Terrorism, state failure, weapons
of mass destruction, regional conflicts and transna-
tional organised crime are listed as major threats to
the Union. State collapse and regional conflicts are
conducive to other threats. Thus priority is given to a
secure environment at the borders of the Union. Under-
lining the importance of rapid reaction to potential
threats and challenges, the ESS, under the heading of
growing activity, capability and coherence, puts mili-
tary intervention in the context of other instruments for
crisis prevention and management such as political,
diplomatic, trade and development activities. Special
attention is given to the civil components and the role
of development aid in post-conflict situations, and to
crisis prevention. The strategy underlines the need for
coherence and co-operation between military and civil
components and the support and use of an effective
multilateral system. It formulates a clear commitment
to positioning the EU as a reliable partner for UN peace
operations. 
1.2 Structures and Procedures of the
ESDP and the Incorporation of Human
Rights 
Despite these policy declarations, on an operational
level coherence between military and civil planning
and decision-making structures seems to be an ongo-
ing challenge. In practice there is considerable overlap
between Commission programmes and the civilian crisis
management bodies in the Council Secretariat which
can lead to gaps or even competition.9 The Commission,
while in a position to submit proposals on the ESDP to
the Council and involved in the implementation of rele-
vant decisions, has the competence (and long-stan-
ding experience) to address civilian aspects of long-
term and structural conflict prevention and post-conflict
institution-building. Decisions on these actions, which
include activities in the fields of civil administration,
civil protection, police and rule of law, are taken within
the Commission while decisions on the deployment of
EU military operations and rule of law and police mis-
sions follow the intergovernmental approach of the
Council. But the Commission activities in civilian cri-
sis management are connected as closely as possible to
ESDP civil missions (such as rule of law and police).
Planning, decision-making and implementation of ope-
rations within the ESDP are undertaken by a series of
different bodies of the Council of the EU. These bodies
all act under the authority of the European Council
and the General Affairs and External Relations Coun-
cil (GAERC). All 27 member states as well as the Com-
mission and the Council Secretariat are represented in
Council Working Groups, the Political and Security
Committee, Committee of Permanent Representatives
and the General Affairs and External Relations Council;
all these bodies are chaired by the Presidency. How-
ever, the relationships between these structures are
not a straightforward hierarchy. Figure 1 (see page 12)
shows the actual working relationships between the
various bodies. 
The ESDP Crisis Management Operations of the EU – Human Rights Included?
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9 See Jakobsen (2004), 7.
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F IGURE 1:
CFSP / ESDP Institutions of the EU (based on: International Crisis Group (2005): 
EU Crisis Response Capability Revisited, Crisis Group Europe Report N°160, January 2005, 17)
LEGEND:
Presides Over/Directs
Reports To
Advises
Policy-making body
Advisory Body
At the Council, the main structures are the following: 
The European Council, composed of heads of state
and governments, agrees by unanimity on common
strategies that set the objectives, duration and means
for EU crisis management. 
The General Affairs and External Relations Coun-
cil (GAERC) / Council of Ministers consists of a
meeting of EU foreign ministers or EU defence minis-
ters. At its sessions on external relations, GAERC deals
with all the Union’s external activities, including com-
mon foreign and security policy. It authorises deci-
sions prepared at ambassadorial level in the Political
and Security Committee as well as the Committee
of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) (see below)
through, for instance, Council conclusions, joint ac-
tions and common positions. The agenda for GAERC
meetings is prepared by the COREPER. 
Appointed by the Council, the EU Special Repre-
sentatives for specific regions contribute, essentially
using diplomatic tools, to conflict prevention and
mediation. Working closely with the heads of mission
in the case of the deployment of an operation in
their respective area, they are mandated to promote
respect for human rights and report to the Council on
their activities in this field.10 
Two bodies are composed of member state represen-
tatives at ambassadorial level.    
The Committee of Permanent Representatives
(COREPER) is an inter-pillar group and composed
of ambassadors from EU member states while chaired
by the presidency of the Council. It has a pivotal role
in decision making. COREPER deals with institutional,
legal and budgetary aspects of CFSP/ESDP and in this
capacity it prepares the Joint Actions which launch
ESDP crisis management operations.
The Political and Security Committee (PSC) is com-
posed of national representatives at ambassadorial
level and attended by Commission and Council Sec-
retariat officials. It is the central structure in CFSP
and ESDP. In close contact with the SG/HR the PSC
has the key role in preparing decision-making by the
political bodies such as the European Council and
the GAERC. The PSC contributes to the ongoing de-
velopment of the ESDP and, most significantly, leads
operations in cooperation with the European Mili-
tary Staff. It prepares options for missions in coope-
ration with the military staff and coordinates contri-
butions to the mission by countries within and out-
side the EU. The PSC sends guidelines to the EUMC
(see below) and receives its recommendations as well
as advice from the Council working groups CIVCOM
and PMG.
An important body works under the directives of the
PSC: 
The EU Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest
military body within the Council. Member states’
chiefs of defence are represented by their military
delegates. The committee provides military advice
and gives recommendations to the PSC and to the
HR/SG; and is supported by the EUMS, to which it
provides military direction during crisis management
operations. The EUMC also monitors the progress
and implementation of military operations. 
Member states are represented in all Council Working
Groups:
The Politico-Military Group (PMG) is a working
group of the PSC. It examines the politico-military as-
pects of all proposals within the framework of the
CFSP, and works on horizontal issues pertaining to
civil and military areas before they are referred to
the PSC.
The Committee of Civilian Aspects of Crisis Ma-
nagement (CIVCOM) as a Council working group is
a consultative body composed of national represen-
tatives plus officials from the Commission and the
Council Secretariat. It receives guidance from the
PSC, for which it also formulates recommendations
and gives advice on civilian aspects of crisis manage-
ment, although it formally reports to COREPER. The
PSC plans and monitors the progress of civilian mis-
sions. 
Another working group of the Council is COHOM,
the Council Working Group on Human Rights, es-
tablished in 1987. Its mandate was extended in 2003
to include first pillar issues so as to have under
purview all human rights aspects of the external rela-
tions of the EU. Whereas COHOM does not usually
discuss missions, it tries to ensure that human rights
aspects in general and the human rights guidelines
in particular are taken into account in civilian and
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10 The SR for Afghanistan has a human rights expert in his team.
1
military crisis management operations. It could po-
tentially play an even bigger role in ensuring human
rights mainstreaming into ESDP operations. As to
ESDP operations, it is important to note that at the
expert level the human rights desk of the Council
Secretariat and some human rights departments in
member states are playing an important role in the
mainstreaming of human rights and gender into the
ESDP, including with regard to planning and reviewing
operations.
The Council Secretariat supports the Council of the
EU and prepares and ensures the smooth functioning
of the Council’s work at all levels and thus has con-
siderable influence over policy development. Within
the Secretariat a Planning and Mission Support Capa-
bility has been established which is responsible for
lessons learnt/best practices after operations and
mission support.11 The Council Secretariat is headed
by the Secretary-General/High Representative (SG/HR). 
Internal Structures of the Council Secretariat: 
The Secretary-General/High Representative for the
CFSP (SG/HR) of the Council assists the Council in
foreign policy matters, through contributing to the
formulation, preparation and implementation of Euro-
pean policy decisions. Moreover he has an essential
function in mediation and facilitation of conflict
resolution through diplomatic action. The SG/HR has
a Personal Representative on Human Rights. 
The Personal Representative of the SG/HR on Hu-
man Rights in the area of CFSP, a post created as
recently as in December 2004 by the Council, has an
important role to play in promoting mainstreaming
of human rights aspects into the CFSP and the ESDP.12
She has access to the sessions of the PSC and to the
Cabinet of the SG/HR.13 
The Secretariat has nine Directorates-General (DG).
One of these deals with External Relations and is di-
vided into nine directorates for geographic and func-
tional areas. To mention the most important in terms
of ESDP and Human Rights, DG IV deals with Transat-
lantic Relations, UN and Human Rights, DG VII with
the European Security and Defence Policy, DG VIII
with Defence Aspects, and DG IX with Civilian Crisis
Management and Coordination. 
The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (Policy
Unit) is part of the Council Secretariat and prepares
policy option papers for the HR/SG that provide him
with daily policy guidance and serve as the basis for
decisions by the PSC (see below). The Unit, which
consists of staff seconded from member states, is
thus under the direct authority of the HR/SG. 
The Situation Centre (SITCEN), which is part of the
Secretariat and also directly attached to the HR/SG,
consists of civilian and military components; staff
are seconded from member states. It monitors the
international situation, drawing on intelligence provi-
ded by member states as well as open-source infor-
mation, and provides the Council’s competent bodies
with situation assessments. It serves both military
and civil decision making. The SITCEN as well as the
Policy Unit and the other bodies can rely on human
rights expertise within the Council Secretariat, on
head of mission reports and on EU human rights fact
sheets pertaining to the human rights situation in
almost every country in the world. SITCEN also func-
tions as communication centre for the SG/HR and
the EU Special Representatives. 
The EU Military Staff (EUMS) is composed of a
considerable number of military experts seconded
from member states, civilian support staff and others,
and provides early warning capability, situation assess-
ment and strategic planning. The EUMS identifies EU
national and international capabilities and provides
the link between the EUMC and the military resources
of member states. Efforts are being made to include
human rights experts in the EUMS, EUMC and the
other structures in Brussels responsible for planning
and conducting the ESDP operations.
The Civil-military Cell which comprises military and
civilian personnel was established within the EUMS
in order to enhance the EUMS’s capacities and liaise
between the EU’s civil and military structures on all
issues related to crisis management. 
It should be added that as regards the European Parlia-
ment (EP), under the terms of the current treaties the
EP has a limited role and restricted constitutional rights
in the framework of CFSP/ESDP: The EP should be regu-
larly informed of the development of the foreign and
security policy of the EU by the Presidency and the
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Commission and it has right to present reports, resolu-
tions and recommendations. Through these and presence
in the field, the EP carries out monitoring in crisis situations.
Yet there is a problem of parliamentary control over
the ESDP operations, with debates going on about the
question how to improve the EP’s scrutiny in this area.14
1.3 EU Human Rights Instruments of
Relevance for the ESDP
1.3.1 Treaty Obligations
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) states in Art. 6 that 
1. The Union is founded on the principles of liberty,
democracy, respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles
which are common to the Member States.
2. The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guar-
anteed by the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they
result from the constitutional traditions common to
the Member States, as general principles of Com-
munity law.
Regarding the standards referred to in Art. 6, the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (EuCJ) in Luxembourg draws in-
spiration not only from the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms (ECHR) and the constitutional traditions of the
member states but also on the guidelines supplied by
international instruments for the protection of human
rights to which member states are signatories15, the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR, 1966),16 and the European Union Charter of
Fundamental Rights.17
Since the Treaty of Rome established the European
Communities in 1957, human rights have been one of
the defining principles of European integration. Since
the early 1990s, the EU has been integrating human
rights clauses into the association and cooperation
agreements concluded under the 1st pillar. With the
Maastricht Treaty of 1992 human rights became an
objective of the Union’s CFSP. Title V of the TEU (Pro-
visions on a common foreign and security policy, Art.
11.1) stipulates five fundamental objectives, the last
of which reads: “to develop and consolidate democra-
cy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms”. This commitment also covers
the ESDP, due to the fact that it is part of the CFSP. Fur-
thermore it includes a two-fold commitment: on the
one hand, it states a policy objective the Union has to
aim at in all external action, and on the other hand, it
declares that the Union is itself in its acts bound to
human rights.18 Consequently, all EU bodies (including
the Council) are bound by these norms, and the same
is true for member states not only through their own
human rights obligations but also in cases where they
act implementing a Council mandate.
A serious problem that may arise within any peace
mission is a human rights violation committed by a
staff member of the mission. Does the local population
have, in such a case, access to an effective remedy?
This touches upon the question of the extraterritorial
validity and applicability of human rights conventions
ratified by member states participating in the mission.
In its General Comment 31 the Human Rights Com-
mittee defines the scope of the International Covenant
of Civil and Political Rights, “within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction” (Art. 2, para. 1) as also re-
lating to persons “to those within the power or effec-
tive control” of the forces of a State Party.19 
Art. 1 of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms grants the
rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention to all
persons within the jurisdiction of the High Contracting
Parties. The European Court of Human Rights, based
in Strasbourg, examining the validity and applicability
of the convention in the Bankovic´ case,20 concluded
that jurisdiction is essentially a territorial notion. The
The ESDP Crisis Management Operations of the EU – Human Rights Included?
1.3 EU Human Rights Instruments of Relevance for the ESDP
15
14 See e.g. Speech on Police, Rule of Law, Monitoring and Security Sector Reform missions under ESDP by Karl von Wogau, 9
October 2006.
15 EuCJ: Judgement of 27 June 2006, Case C-540/03, para. 35.
16 Ibid., para. 37.
17 Ibid., para. 38.
18 Baldus confirms this in his comment on the right to freedom and security as a fundamental right: “Dass die militärischen Or-
gane der Europäischen Union bei der Teilnahme an bewaffneten Konflikten in vollem Umfang an die Grundrechte gebunden
sind, kann nicht zweifelhaft sein, da nach dem EU-Vertrag die gesamte Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik unter
dem Ziel der Achtung der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten steht“. Baldus 2006, 457. 
19 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31, The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties
to the Covenant, para. 10, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, 26 May 2004.
20 Bankovic´ and Others vs. Belgium and 16 other Contracting States, Appl. No. 52207/99, European Court of Human Rights, 
12 December 2001.
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judgement was strongly contested.21 As academic con-
troversies on the notion of “within its jurisdiction” con-
tinue and further cases relating to extraterritorial appli-
cability of the Convention are pending before the
Strasbourg Court,22 the discussion on an adequate legal
response on human rights violations by peace missions
remains open.
A detailed framework agreement, a memorandum of
understanding or some other international law source
must be agreed upon as the point of reference for the
operation’s justification.23 This is also critical in order
to minimise concerns about external actors challenging
local authority, since military and police operations,
especially, go to the heart of a host state’s sovereignty.24
The mission will further act under the human rights
provisions of a peace agreement (if this exists) and the
obligations of the sending states.25 In the first place,
though, the human rights obligations under which a
peace operation of the EU is performed will depend on
legal obligations of the host state, i.e. the constitution
and the human rights treaties ratified by the host state. 
1.3.2 Human Rights and Gender Mainstreaming
Guidelines
In order to generally promote human rights outside
the Community the EC/EU has, since the early 1960s,
developed a wide range of instruments in the sphere of
diplomacy, development, trade and humanitarian aid.
These include, inter alia, declarations and demarches,
common strategies, common positions, joint actions,
human rights clauses in agreements with third states
(1995) and provisions on political dialogue and con-
flict resolution (notably the Cotonou Agreement). Since
2000 the EU has also been focusing on election moni-
toring, with 34 missions completed. The EU is, together
with its member states, the biggest donor of develop-
ment and humanitarian aid worldwide.26 Human rights
promotion forms an important part of these activities.
As a consequence of the EU’s commitment to human
rights, the Council has adopted a number of human
rights guidelines: the guidelines on the death penalty
(1998), on torture and other cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment (2001), on human rights dialogues
with third countries (2001), on children in armed con-
flict (2003) and on the protection of human rights de-
fenders (2004). These guidelines apply to the ESDP as
well, as it is part of the CFSP. According to the 2005 EU
Annual Report on Human Rights, civilian and military
crisis management operations play an important role in
the implementation of these guidelines, in particular
those relating to children and armed conflict.27 The
latter are explicitly related to the ESDP, since their
adoption took place shortly after the first ESDP mission
to the DR Congo (operation Artemis). Because of their
relevance for the ESDP, they will be considered in
greater detail here, along with the EU follow up to UN
Security Council Resolution 1325 on peace, women
and security,28 the Council Document on Mainstreaming
Human Rights across the CFSP, and other EU policies. 
The EU guidelines on children and armed conflict, adop-
ted by the General Affairs Council on 8 December 2003,
address the short-, medium- and long-term impact of
armed conflict on children.29 Referring to the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child, which, although al-
most universally ratified, is by no means universally
applied, the EU guidelines aim to raise awareness both
within the EU and among third parties of the devas-
tating impact of armed conflict on children. They en-
courage non-EU countries and non-state actors to imple-
ment international law, to take effective measures to
protect children from the effects of armed conflict and
to put an end to the recruitment of children into armies
and armed groups.
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European Court of Human Rights.
23 See Oakley et al (1998), 401.
24 See Hansen (2002), 80.
25 Ratification of the ECHR is a precondition for EU membership.
26 €100 million per year have been spent on the promotion of democracy and human rights through the EIDHR (European Ini-
tiative for Democracy and Human Rights). See EIDHR website http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/projects/eidhr/eidhr_en.htm#
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27 See EU Annual Report on Human Rights (2005), 19.
28 Council of the EU, 11932/2/05 Rev 2, Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the context of ESDP. Brussels, 29 September 2005
(CEU 11932/2/05, Rev 2).
29 Council of the EU, 15634/03, EU Guidelines on Children and Armed Conflict. Brussels, 4 December 2003 (CEU 15634/03).
The guidelines explicitly refer to crisis management
operations by emphasising that the EU will pay special
attention to the protection of children in armed conflict
when taking action aimed at maintaining peace and
security. According to the guidelines, heads of missions
and military commanders (through the chain of com-
mand) should include in their periodic reports an analy-
sis of the effects of conflict on children. In particular,
“violations and abuses against children, recruitment and
deployment of children by armies and armed groups,
killing and maiming of children, attacks against schools
and hospitals, blockage of humanitarian access, sexual
and gender-based violence against children, abduction
of children and the measures taken to combat them
by the parties in case” should be addressed. The guide-
lines also state that the issue of protection of children
should be adequately tackled during the planning process
of an operation and in training activities for missions.
As a follow up to the guidelines and in order to ensure
that child right concerns are systematically addressed
throughout the entire process of an ESDP operation the
Council of the EU adopted a on 23 May 2006 a Check-
list for the Integration of the Protection of Children
affected by Armed Conflict.30 While mission mandates
should address key child protection concerns, relevant
child protection issues should also be incorporated into
the terms of reference for assessment and lessons learnt
processes. Furthermore, during the conduct of the mis-
sions collaboration with relevant international, natio-
nal and local partners should be sought. 
In recent years, gender in armed conflict zones has
been one of the important topics addressed by the
UN.31 UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000), the
most comprehensive UN resolution on the position of
women in peacebuilding activities, recognises the ur-
gent need to mainstream gender perspectives into
peace operations in order to ensure the effectiveness of
the missions. Striving to increase the involvement of
women at all levels of field operations and decision-
making related to conflict prevention and resolution, as
well as in areas such as disarmament, demobilisation
and reintegration (DDR), it promotes women as advo-
cates for peace and seeks to expand the contribution
of women to field operations. It also acknowledges the
necessity to respect the different needs of men and
women and to take special measures with regard to
the protection of women and girls in conflict zones. 
In respect of a gender perspective in EU policies, Art. 3(2)
of the EC Treaty provides a legal basis for gender main-
streaming. It states that “the Community shall aim to
eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality, bet-
ween men and women in all its activities”, while Art. 2
states that “the promotion of equality between men and
women is a task of the European Community”. Gender
mainstreaming is defined in the 1995 Commission com-
munication as involving “not restricting efforts to pro-
mote equality to the implementation of specific mea-
sures to help women, but mobilising all general policies
and measures specifically for the purpose of achieving
equality by actively and openly taking into account at
the planning stage their possible effects on the respec-
tive situation of men and women (gender perspective).
This means systematically examining measures and poli-
cies and taking into account such possible effects when
defining and implementing them”.32 In terms of CFSP
and ESDP, the Council confirms that “gender equality
is a fundamental principle of the EU’s foreign and se-
curity policy” and “that efforts should be made to inte-
grate gender related issues in ESDP policy making”.33 In
2005 the EU Ministers responsible for Gender Equality
reaffirmed their commitment to implementing policies
and programmes following UN Security Council Resolu-
tion 1325,34 while in the Council Conclusion of May 2005
the GAERC encouraged its bodies to carry out further
work in fields related to the implementation of the UN
Resolution.35 In September 2006, reflecting later de-
velopments, the Council drafted a strategy on the imple-
mentation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on
peace, women and security,36 which proposes measures
to implement the Resolution within the ESDP.37
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The Council adopted Conclusions on Promoting Gen-
der Equality and Gender Mainstreaming in Crisis
Management in November 2006.38 These Conclusions
have to some extent been approved as a reaction to
the findings of a case study on gender main-
streaming in ESDP operations carried out by the EU
Institute for Security Studies at the request of the
EU.39 The study, which makes specific reference to
the missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM and
Althea), was undertaken to look at gender aspects in
the ESDP missions. According to the authors the in-
ternational security presence failed to effectively
address the gender dimension of post-conflict sta-
bilisation of Bosnian society. There was no gender
perspective included in the Dayton Peace negotia-
tions, nor in the mandates of the operations. Among
mission staff there is little knowledge of what pur-
pose gender mainstreaming serves.40 The stereoty-
pical notion that the deployment of women soldiers
may be inappropriate in the context of “traditional”
societies is common. Furthermore, gender balancing
is not (yet) an issue in the police reform in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, although the deployment of local
female police officers who can handle the female
victims of domestic violence and trafficking would
be important. With regard to human trafficking and
prostitution it is problematic that the rules for mis-
sion staff, which strictly prohibit either, may apply
only to the mission area, which shifts the problem
across the borders. There has been no systematic
cooperation between the EU and national women’s
groups. Another persistent problem concerns sexual
harassment of female (and male) soldiers and the fact
that many women do not know who to report to if
they are harassed. Overall the study recommends im-
plementing gender mainstreaming as an instrument
to improve the operational effectiveness of crisis
management operations and enhance human rights. 
In the Council Conclusions on the implementation of EU
policy on human rights and democratisation in third
countries adopted in December 2006, the Council again
reiterated its commitment to promoting gender equali-
ty and gender mainstreaming in crisis management.
According to these Conclusions, which underline the
need to take practical measures to strengthen the human
rights perspective in the ESDP, efforts are to be under-
taken to develop a standard field manual on human
rights for ESDP missions.41
Another important tool is the Council Document on
Mainstreaming Human Rights across CFSP and other EU
policies,42 which was adopted in June 2006 and is in
line with Art.11 of the TEU. This article states that the
EU is committed to mainstreaming human rights and
democratisation into EU policies in order to achieve a
more coherent and effective EU human rights policy.
With regard to ESDP missions and operations the main-
streaming document maintains in I.7:
“The protection of human rights should be systematically
addressed in all phases of ESDP operations, both during
the planning and implementation phase, including by
measures ensuring that the necessary human rights
expertise is available to operations at headquarter level
and in theatre; training of staff; and by including hu-
man rights reporting in the operational duties of ESDP
missions.” 
Furthermore the Council Secretariat and Presidency shall:
(29) “integrate human rights provisions in guiding
documents and reviews of ESDP missions and opera-
tions where relevant, inter alia by making use of the
human rights fact sheet and seeking advise of relevant
UN agencies and NGOs”;
(30) “implement human rights policy in context of ESDP
missions and operations where relevant, in particular as
regards women and children, including by monitoring
and reporting on human rights related issues;
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(31) “include human rights experts in ESDP missions
and operations where appropriate.”
Member states, the Commission and the Council Secre-
tariat should:
(32) “provide human rights training to personnel serving
in ESDP missions and operations;“
(33) “integrate human rights aspects as part of flanking
measures or technical assistance provided in the con-
text of ESDP missions and operations where appropriate.”
Effective distribution of information on human rights
issues to all relevant actors is to be ensured, as well as
an annual review of the progress achieved towards the
implementation of the document.43
Finally, the guidelines on the promotion of internatio-
nal humanitarian law need to be mentioned.44 As stated
in the conclusions on the implementation of the EU Hu-
man Rights policy (2005), they are another instrument
to promote human rights in the framework of CFSP.45
The objective of these guidelines is to set out operational
tools for the EU and its institutions to promote com-
pliance with international humanitarian law,46 as set
out in the Hague and Geneva Conventions (and their
Additional Protocols).47 All EU member states are par-
ties to the Geneva Convention and their Additional
Protocols and thus under the obligation to abide by their
rules,48 and the EU itself has also declared its commit-
ment to the application of humanitarian law to peace-
keeping operations.49 According to Council Document
13310/01, “humanitarian law, which could be classified
as universal sui generis law, serves in association with
‘human rights’ as an essential, efficient and effective le-
gal instrument for managing the legal aspects of crisis
situations”.50
1.3.3 Standards of Behaviour for 
Mission Personnel
In line with these commitments of the Union there are
legal obligations of personnel deployed in ESDP opera-
tions. Staff must apply the provisions of international
law, including, when applicable, the law of armed con-
flict, and the laws of the contributing state. As a rule
personnel is also obliged to respect local law unless
the execution of the mission requires otherwise.51 The
sanitised version of the Operation Plan for the military
operation Concordia in Macedonia,52 for instance,
states that “all use of force in the former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia (fYROM) by EU-led forces will be
governed by the principles of necessity and propor-
tionality. While the bases of the EU’s mission in the
fYROM include UN determinations, EU led forces will
respect local law”. The clarification of the laws applying
in the region in question from the beginning of the in-
tervention is thus an indispensable precondition; and if
local law (previous or current) reflects human rights
principles better it must obviously be applied.53 There-
fore there is the need for mission personnel to receive
information on local cultural traditions and inherent
norms. In addition, though, operation staff must fully
respect international human rights and criminal justice
standards at all times.54 They must, furthermore, co-
operate fully with any human rights mechanisms. Un-
fortunately, as UN operations have shown, this has not
always been the case. There have been numerous in-
stances of misconduct committed by international staff
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54 The set of standards and rules mission staff are obliged to respect is very complex. To ensure practicability, the individual
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For an example see page 39.
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in peace operations.55 If this happens, it can have a
devastating effect on the entire mission. The most se-
vere consequence would be the loss of credibility, trust,
respect and confidence among the population.56
The local population, on the other hand, are the prin-
cipal victims of internal conflict, and in order to pro-
tect them it is crucial to promote rules for the appro-
priate use of force and codes of conduct for combatants.
Appropriate use of force is regulated in the so-called
rules of engagement (ROE), which are usually based
on a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). While SOFAs
define the legal status of military operation personnel
in the territory of the host state, and clarify the terms
under which they are allowed to operate, ROEs deter-
mine at what time, place and in what way force may
be used. In spite of their crucial relevance for the appli-
cation of human rights and humanitarian law in armed
conflict they will not be discussed here as they are not
public.57 Apart from the use of force, other potential
areas of misconduct are behaviour towards the local
population and criminal acts. Standards of behaviour
for EU personnel were drafted following accusations
in Bosnia.58 On 18 November 2003, the PSC took note
that CIVCOM had agreed on “Draft Guidelines on Pro-
tection of Civilians in EU-led Crisis Management Ope-
rations”,59 and the PSC approved the “Generic Standards
of Behaviour for ESDP Operations” on 19 May 2005.60
The generic standards should be seen as complemen-
tary to the guidelines on protection of civilians. Both
are living documents which are reviewed and adjusted
as a consequence of lessons learnt. 
The “Draft Guidelines on Protection of Civilians in EU-
led Crisis Management Operations” were developed “to
ensure that special protection, rights and assistance
needs of civilians are fully addressed in all EU-led crisis
management operations”. Beside various other aspects,
the need for special measures to protect women and
children, especially girls, from sexual exploitation, abuse
and trafficking is highlighted. The strict observation
and monitoring of compliance with the UN’s “Ten Rules:
Code of Personal Conduct for Blue Helmets”, as well
as the Six Core Principles established by the UN Inter-
Agency Standing Committee in its “Plan of Action on
Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Hu-
manitarian Crises” is recommended. The guidelines fur-
ther provide that “with a view to promoting the impor-
tant role of women in conflict prevention and resolution
[…], in addition to the mainstreaming of a child rights
perspective […], measures will be taken to mainstream
a gender perspective taking into account all relevant
UN Security Council resolutions”. Such measures could
include the incorporation of gender analysis into early
warning activities, the inclusion of gender expertise in
fact-finding missions, planning and implementation
processes and field operations, and the integration of
gender perspectives into all standard operating proce-
dures and other guidance materials for crisis manage-
ment operations. 
The “Generic Standards of Behaviour for ESDP Opera-
tions” complement these guidelines and the legal obli-
gations of personnel in accordance with international
law and the law of the contributing state. They have,
according to the document, to be tailored to each ope-
ration specifically, and cover all relevant standards to
ensure the appropriate behaviour of personnel with re-
gard to each other and to the local population. The
Standards stipulate that it is critical “that all people, be
it local population or personnel, are treated with dig-
nity and respect, regardless of sex, age, ethnic origin,
religion, sexual orientation, disability, social or econo-
mic status or political views”. They specifically refer to
gender issues by stating that the “exchange of money,
employment, goods or services for sex, including sexual
favours or other forms of humiliating, degrading or ex-
ploitative behaviour, is prohibited”.
Furthermore, for each operation special arrangements
concerning disciplinary matters and the status of the
mission and its staff are developed in relevant planning
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documents,61 which are concluded between the EU,
the host state and the sending state.62 In addition to the
Joint Actions/Mandates for each operation, an Opera-
tion Plan is developed which is also extremely relevant
on the subject of clear-cut rules of behaviour of person-
nel.63 The Aceh Monitoring Mission AMM, for instance,
also had a special “Code of Conduct” for its monitors.64
Concerning the implementation of the standards it is,
as maintained by the Generic Standards, the responsi-
bility of the heads of mission (HoM) or operation com-
manders (OComs) and senior management to ensure
that these values are fully explained to the personnel
and applied consistently.65 They are usually also res-
ponsible for monitoring the implementation of the
standards. Furthermore, according to the former HoM
of EUPOL Proxima (Macedonia), there are reporting
obligations a mission has to fulfil. The ambassadors of
the member states also report to the respective for-
eign ministers whose representatives sit on those super-
visory bodies in Brussels. They receive reports on the si-
tuation on the ground and the work of the mission on
a bi-weekly basis.66
What, however, are the procedures, when misconduct
occurs? Misconduct, such as human rights abuse, is
regarded an extremely serious concern and should be
treated as such according to all documents, mentioned
above. In practice, in the realities of the situation the
entire issue constitutes a matter of a sensitive and,
consequently, intransparent nature. There is no infor-
mation available on cases of human rights violations in
EU operations (if there have been any at all). What can
be stated, however, is that there have been instances
of neglect of duty or malfeasance in EU operations.
This has been confirmed for two missions, Proxima and
AMM.67
In a case of misconduct or any violation of the above-
mentioned standards, disciplinary measures are to be
conducted. These measures are independent of possi-
ble criminal procedures.
Regarding the latter, military and civilian personnel are
subject to the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of their
sending state under the current standard agreements.
Obviously, this exclusivity can result in problematic ju-
risdictional gaps particularly for cases of abuse against
local civilians and violence against women. The status
of the mission and its staff – military or civilian – is
governed by arrangements with the authorities of the
host country.68 As regards military operations, Joint
Action 2003/423/CFSP on the EU military operation in
the DR Congo (Artemis), states that during the opera-
tion, members of the sending party benefit from the
provisions of Article VI of the 1946 Convention re-
garding experts on UN missions, in particular con-
cerning immunity from personal arrest or detention
and immunity from legal process in respect of any act
done by them while they perform their duties.
Commonly the personnel of civilian missions are “gran-
ted all privileges and immunities equivalent to that of
diplomatic agents granted under the Vienna Conven-
tion on Diplomatic Relations of 18 April 1961, subject
to which the EU Member States shall have priority of
jurisdiction”.69 The SG/HR can waive the immunity en-
joyed by personnel “where such immunity would im-
pede the course of justice”,70 but only with the explicit
consent of the authority of the sending state. The
Council Decision on the conclusion of an agreement
between the EU and the Government of Indonesia on
the status of AMM and its personnel in Aceh further-
more provided that the AMM staff shall not be liable
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61 See Generic Standards of behaviour, CEU 8373/3/05 REV 3.
62 See e.g. Council Joint Action 2005/826/CFSP of 18 July 2005 on the establishment of an EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM) (CJA 2005/826/CFSP) or Council Joint Action 2004/847/CFSP of 
9 December 2004 on the European Union Police Mission in Kinshasa (DRC) regarding the Integrated Police Unit (EUPOL 
‘Kinshasa’) (CJA 2004/847/CFSP).
63 See e-mail interview with Jürgen Scholz, 24 April 2006.
64 The AMM’s code of conduct based on the standards of behaviour was contained in the AMM Standard Operating Procedures
(SOPs) that, according to the former Spokesperson for AMM, each monitor reads and signs to confirm that they have been
understood. See AMM, 2006.
65 The Council General Secretariat is to ensure that OCom and HoM are suitably advised.
66 See e-mail interview with Jürgen Scholz, former Head of Mission of Proxima, 24 April 2006.
67 See e-mail interview with Jürgen Scholz on 24 April 2006 and e-mail interview with the former spokesman of the AMM
mission (9 June 2006). One case of sexual misconduct on the part of an AMM monitor was handled promptly and appropri-
ately when the person in question was dismissed, and the AMM apologized for his/her behaviour to the Acehnese people.
See ICG (2006b), 9.
68 See e.g. EUPAT: CJA 2005/826/CFSP or EUPOL Kinshasa: CJA 2004/847/CFSP.
69 Council of the EU, 15705/1/03 Rev 1, Agreement between the EU and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the
status and activities of the European Union Police Mission EUPOL PROXIMA in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
Brussels, 5 December 2003, Art. 6 (CEU 15705/1/03 Rev 1).
70 CEU 15705/1/03 Rev 1; Council of the EU, 13972/04, Council Decision concerning the Conclusion of the Agreement between
the European Union and Georgia on the status and activities of the EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia EUJUST Themis. 
Brussels, 17 November 2004 (CEU 13972/04).
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to any form of arrest or detention, and that no mea-
sures of execution may be taken, except in the case
where a civil proceeding not related to their official
functions is instituted against them.71 The AMM per-
sonnel thus had immunity from the jurisdiction of the
Republic of Indonesia. But it was subject to the juris-
dictions of their respective Sending States.
The rules and procedures for disciplinary measures for
misconduct, on the other hand, differ for civilian and
military personnel, but for each operation special
arrangements concerning discipline are developed in
the relevant planning documents.72
In the case of a military operation, Joint Action
2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003 on the EU military ope-
ration in the DR Congo (Artemis) provides that members
of the sending state remain members of the armed
forces of the sending party, remain under its command
and are subject to their own service laws and regula-
tions during the operation. In the case of misconduct
by a mission staff, the OCom is responsible for disci-
plinary measures. If a case is reported to the authori-
ties of the host state, they shall inform the OCom and
the person in question shall be handed over to the
OCom. He will then take disciplinary measures and, if
necessary, effect repatriation. The authorities of the
host state shall be informed about the measures taken.73
For civilian missions the HoM is usually responsible for
disciplinary control over staff. With regard to civilian
personnel seconded by member states, third states or
EU institutions, full disciplinary jurisdiction is retained
by relevant national authorities or authorities within
the EU institutions.74 The decision on which disciplinary
measures will be applied is also made by the HoM. The
ultimate disciplinary sanction is dismissal and return to
the sending member state, which should then take any
further action in terms of criminal jurisdiction. For UN
operations it has been proved that in the vast majority
of cases the member state does not undertake any
measures – which indicates that this accountability
structure contains some problems, one of these being
the risk that the immunity of international personnel
could trigger the loss of legitimacy and credibility among
the local population.75
Theoretically OCom or HoM have to ensure that their
personnel are aware of complaint procedures which
exist for each mission. All personnel have the right and
obligation to report cases of serious misconduct and
criminal activity, and the right to complain to the HoM,
to the relevant institutions of their sending state or to
the institutions in Brussels.76 Serious incidents should
be reported through the chain of command in accor-
dance with the specific reporting procedures established
for each operation.77
1.3.4 Pre-Deployment Training 
Shortly after the Feira European Council the EU com-
mitted itself to developing appropriate common stand-
ards and modules for training in the different civilian
priority areas identified in Feira, while at the Göteborg
European Council, the EU adopted the plan to develop
common training modules and standards in the area
of rule of law.78
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71 Council of the EU, 12504/05, Council Decision concerning the Conclusion of the Agreement in the form of an exchange of
letters between the EU and the Government of Indonesia on the tasks, status, privileges and immunities of the EU Monitoring
Mission in Aceh (Indonesia) and its personnel. Brussels, 28 September 2005 (CEU 12504/05).
72 See Generic Standards of Behaviour CEU 8373/3/05 REV 3.
73 See Council of the EU, 10773/03, Agreements between the European Union and the Republic of Uganda, as well as between
the European Union and the Democratic Republic of Congo on the status of forces of the EU Military Operation in the DRC.
Brussels, 26 June 2003 (CEU 10773/03).
74 See Council Joint Action 2005/643/CFSP of 9 September 2005 on the European Union Monitoring Mission in Aceh (Indonesia).
Brussels (CJA 2005/643/CFSP).
75 See Hansen (2002), 81.
76 See e-mail interview with Jürgen Scholz (see footnote 66).
77 The chain of command is similar in all operations: Military operations are conducted under the responsibility of the operation
commander (EUOC). The EU Military Committee (EUMC) monitors the proper execution of the operation, and receives reports
from the commander at regular intervals. The chairman of the EUMC, in turn, reports to the PSC on the conduct of the 
operation, while the PSC reports to the Council. See e.g. Concordia: Council Joint Action 2003/92/CFSP of 27 January 2003
on the European Union military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Brussels (CJA 2003/92/CFSP) and
Artemis: Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003 on the European Union military operation in the Democratic
Republic of Congo. Brussels (CJA 2003/423/CFSP). The chain of command for civilian missions usually involves the head of
mission leading the operation, assuming its day-to-day management and reporting to the SG/HR through the EUSR. The 
EUSR then reports to the PSC and to the Council through the SG/HR. The SG/HR gives guidance to the head of mission
through the EUSR, while the PSC exercises political control and provides strategic guidance.
78 See Council of the EU, 14513/02, Comprehensive EU concept for missions in the field of Rule of Law in crisis management,
including Annexes. Brussels, 19 November 2002 (CEU 14513/02).
But since then the training itself has been chiefly a
national responsibility. Member states are expected to
provide the EU with well-trained personnel. Further
training at EU level is regarded as “additional training”.79
Work at the EU level on the issue of training for ESDP
is connected with three training actors: the European
Security and Defence College (ESDC), the European Po-
lice College (CEPOL) and the EC Project on Training for
Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. 
The ESDC was established by the EU Council in July 2005.
It consists of a network of national institutes, colleges
and institutions within the EU that deal with security
and defence policy issues in order to provide training
in the field of European Security and Defence Policy. The
ESDC training activities are organised into ESDP high-
level and orientation courses. Participants are normally
military or civilian personnel working for EU Member
States, acceding states and the EU institutions.80 Poli-
cy decisions on curricula are taken by representatives
of all 27 member states (the steering committee of the
ESDC); substance of the individual courses is developed
in the Executive Academic Board of the ESDC, composed
of academic advisors from all institutions participating
in the academic activities, especially those who take
part in the respective academic year.81 The EC Project
for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (ECP) was
started up in 2001 by the EU Commission. As its main
audience it targets diplomatic, civilian and military key
personnel of EU member states and personnel for EU-led
missions, and includes core and specialised courses.82
CEPOL, lastly, is a network to bring together the natio-
nal training institutes for senior police officers in the
member states. It was established in 2005 by a Council
Decision.83
A series of documents identifies human rights training
needs. In 2005 the EU prepared a list of training require-
ments for ESDP,84 which was reviewed again in May
2006.85 Among the various requirements, “knowledge
of International Law including International Humanita-
rian Law and human rights issues, gender issues and
child rights issues, including their application in the
context of ESDP missions/operations” is listed at all
different levels,86 and for all training audiences,87 ex-
cept for Civil-Military Staff at the basic and speciali-
sation courses. Furthermore a Draft EU Training Pro-
gram in ESDP has been drawn up,88 which includes the
current version of the Academic Program of the three
main training actors for ESDP training. The CEPOL work
programme 2007 lists human rights and police ethics
as a requirement within leadership training.89 For 2006
the programme of the ECP offers courses on human
rights, child protection and the rule of law, plus a spe-
cialisation course on DDR, while a course on gender
development has been added to a similar program for
2007. Thus the proposal of the Draft Operational Paper
on the Implementation of UN Security Council Reso-
lution 1325 to take up measures to ensure gender
training seems to have been taken into consideration.90
In respect of such improvements, training standards
of other international organisations are now also be-
ing taken into consideration in order to ensure com-
plementarity.91 The UN, UNICEF, Save the Children, the
OHCHR, the Secretary-General’s Special Representative
on Children and Armed Conflict, the ICRC and various
NGOs have all indicated their willingness to assist in
training EU personnel. Furthermore, a high-level EU-UN
staff-to-staff steering group discusses twice a year the
developments with regard to co-operation, best prac-
tices, and training.92 In addition, in order to prevent
any violations of human rights and breaches of the
standards by mission staff, the “Generic Standards of
Behaviour” stipulate that pre-deployment training of
personnel should include education on prescribed stan-
dards of behaviour. Particular attention should be given
to international law, including humanitarian law and
human rights issues. The “Draft Guidelines on Protec-
tion of Civilians in EU-led Crisis Management Opera-
tions” also demand that in the preparation of relevant
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79 See Hazelzet (2006), 572.
80 ESDP Newsletter, Issue 2, June 2006, online at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/ESDP_Newsletter_ISSUE2.pdf.
81 Interview with Rolf-Werner Markus, Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, 7 February 2007.
82 See Council of the EU, 10547/04, ESDP Presidency Report 2004. Brussels, 17 December 2004 (CEU 10547/04), para. 23-25.
83 Council Decision 2005/681/JHA.
84 See Council of the EU 7774/2/05 Rev 2, Implementation of the EU Training Concept in ESDP – Draft Analysis of Training 
requirements in the field of ESDP. Brussels, 14 April 2005 (CEU 7774/2/05 Rev 2).
85 Council of the EU, 8624/3/06 Rev 3, Analysis of Training Requirements in the field of ESDP – Draft Review 2006. Brussels, 
19 May 2006 (CEU 8624/3/06 Rev 3).
86 General/Basic ESDP Preparation Training, Specialisation and Generic Training, Mission Training.
87 Diplomats, Civilians, Military, Police, Civil-Military, Candidate Countries, Third States. 
88 Council of the EU 5561/06, Draft EU Training Programme in ESDP (2006-2008). Brussels, 23 January 2006 (CEU 5561/06).
89 Accessible at http://www.cepol.net/KIM/plaatjes/pictemp185125.pdf. 
90 Council of the EU, Implementation of UNSCR 1325 in the context of ESDP. Brussels, 29 September 2005 (CEU 11932/2/05 Rev 2).
91 See CEU 14513/02, Annex.
92 See Hazelzet (2006), 572.
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training curricula and materials special attention should
be paid to human rights, and the rights and protection
of children and other vulnerable groups, including the
special needs of women and girls to be protected from
sexual exploitation and abuse, as well as trafficking,
gender mainstreaming and HIV/AIDS awareness.93
At present, some individual member states do inte-
grate human rights elements into their training for
military and civil mission staff, with differing priori-
ties. It is still a question to which extent the decisions
listed above on the integration of human rights training
on EU level have been put into practice. The most re-
cent final training report of the EU on ESDP training
does not mention the term human rights at all,94 while
according to the report ECP training has, at least, suc-
cessfully provided the EU with well trained experts on
rule of law. Regarding ESDC high level and orientation
courses, to date, human rights play a marginal role,
due to the given overall objective to discuss all aspects
of ESDP.95 This could be changed, of course. It would be
up to individual member states that could, in close co-
operation with the Council secretariat, set new priori-
ties within ESDP training and thus promote a stronger
human rights agenda for ESDC and other EU training
for ESDP missions. Discussions on the integration of
human rights on different levels are at an early stage
and should be taken forward by member states who
want to see an ESDP that does justice to EU human
rights obligations and commitments. Central training
components in this respect could be basic knowledge
of international and regional human rights protection,
practical fact-finding, monitoring and reporting of human
rights violations, and the application of standards of be-
haviour within the mission and towards the civilian
population. Training should also deepen awareness of
gender-sensitive relations with the civilian population
and deepen knowledge on anti-discrimination measures.
1.4 ESDP Crisis Management Capabilities
– a Brief Overview 
Crisis management has been a focal point of attention
for the EU since 1999 when the HR/SG Javier Solana
defined crisis management tasks as one of the core issues
of the process of strengthening CFSP. Since then the EU
has demonstrated that it can rapidly deploy military
and civilian operations, whether in the context of a
UN operation, whether with recourse to NATO assets
and capabilities or autonomously. Regarding crisis man-
agement co-operation with other organisations, the
EU has vastly increased its involvement with, inter alia,
the UN, the African Union, OSCE, ASEAN as well as with
ICRC and international NGOs.96 Between the EU and
the UN, for instance, a Joint Declaration on EU-UN Co-
operation covering both civilian and military aspects of
crisis management was signed on 24 September 2003.97
On the whole, the EU does now have at its disposal an
institutional infrastructure with a capacity to carry out
crisis management operations. This is, however, un-
deniably still work in progress. The following two chap-
ters will briefly summarise the present state of military
and civilian capabilities of the Union. 
1.4.1 Military Crisis Management Capabilities 
of ESDP
With the aim of putting at the Union’s disposal forces
capable of carrying out the Petersberg tasks – including
combat-like operations – from 1999 on the EU mem-
ber states set themselves a military capability target
called the Headline Goal. It was to be met by the end
of 2003 and called for EU member states to be able to
deploy 60,000 troops within 60 days, sustainable for a
year, and for smaller rapid response components de-
ployable on a much shorter timescale.
With the Berlin plus agreement (2003) NATO granted
the EU access to its assets and capabilities. The agree-
ment comprises four principles: assured EU access to
NATO operational planning, availability to the EU of
NATO capabilities and common assets, NATO European
command options for EU-led operations, including the
establishment of terms of reference for a European
role for NATO’s Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Eu-
rope (DSACEUR), and adaptation of the NATO defence
planning system to incorporate the availability of forces
for EU operations.
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The question of operational planning headquarters was
solved with the agreement between member states to
establish a permanent small cell within NATO’s opera-
tional headquarters, SHAPE, for EU operations using
NATO assets. 
For autonomous EU operations, operational planning
should take place in national headquarters. In 2003,
though, it was agreed that operational planning in the
EU Military Staff (in the recently established civil-mili-
tary planning cell) is another option in case of civil/
military cooperation being required and no national
headquarter being available.
In terms of the enhancement of military capabilities, EU
member states have committed themselves to the es-
tablishment of 15 rapidly deployable battle groups,
which will be able to reach trouble spots within 15
days. In May 2004, EU defence ministers adopted a
new “Headline Goal 2010”. This capability strategy is
aimed at the establishment of a European Armaments
Agency and a civil-military cell able to set up an ope-
ration centre rapidly, the completion of the develop-
ment of the battle groups – with a rapid deployment
capacity of only ten days after EU decision – and for a
series of other infrastructural, co-coordinative and
qualitative measures. Substantial progress has been
achieved with respect to these goals: the civil-military
cell has been operational since 2004 and the battle
groups will be fully operational by January 2007.98
Beside the purely military capabilities, the European
Gendarmerie, a military police force launched in early
2006, needs to be mentioned. The non-permanent force
with executive functions will have 800 police officers
available to deploy within 30 days notice and a pool of
2,300 reinforcements on standby. The force will be used
for post-conflict peacekeeping, maintaining public order
and smoothing the difficult transition from military to
civilian operations in crisis areas.99
With the help of all these recently established military
capabilities and the new structural mechanisms of PSC,
EUMC, EUMS, which support them, the EU has, since
2003, launched five military operations. 
1.4.2. Civilian Crisis Management Capabilities
under ESDP
The EU Security Strategy defines civilian crisis manage-
ment simply as “helping restore civil government after
crises”.100 In essence, it is a tool for international ac-
tors to help to create structures which enable the state
to provide a secure environment, public order and the
functioning of the state and its administration as services
to its citizens. According to Dwan, civilian crisis manage-
ment is “not a ‘soft’ option for intervention but a funda-
mental element in building a sustainable peace”. It rep-
resents “an approach that is centred not on the
application of overwhelming military force, but rather,
on the provision of security and safety to the citizens
of a state through a human rights-based rule of law”.101
EU crisis management has a long tradition and is basi-
cally carried out by the Commission. Special attention
is given to crisis prevention.102 Nevertheless, Pillar II
of the EU (CFSP/ESDP) is also involved in the civilian
crisis management of the Union. The Council itself has
civil crisis management tools at its disposal and is con-
tinuously strengthening that area with the help of the
structural mechanisms mentioned above. At the Feira
Council in June 2000 EU civilian crisis management
capacity was divided into four priority areas: policing,
rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection.
These have been complemented by monitoring capa-
bilities and support to Special Representatives of the
EU. Nearly 400 experts have been named by member
states to cover human rights, political affairs, gender
and security sector reform. In addition, 100 experts
have been trained as part of “Civilian Crisis Response
Teams”, including a few human rights experts. In Janu-
ary 2007, the need to consider increasing the number
of human rights experts in this pool in line with EU
human rights policy was identified at the level of PSC.
So member states are presently working on the
achievement of the “Civilian Headline Goal 2008” to re-
fine and complete existing capabilities which are based
on civil servants that could be seconded by member
states – more than 5.500 police officers, more than
600 rule of law experts, 500 for civil administration
and nearly 5000 for civil protection. 
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schnellen Krisenprävention pro Halbjahr. Deutschland wird im ersten Halbjahr 2007 eine ‘Battlegroup’ mit Finnland und
den Niederlanden aufstellen. Von 2013 an soll auf der Basis der Kooperation zwischen Deutschland, Frankreich und Polen
im Rahmen des so genannten ‘Weimarer Dreiecks’ die ESVP intensiviert und eine gemeinsame ‘Battlegroup’ eingerichtet
werden.” Bendiek (2006), 30.
99 See Fraser (2006).
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Human rights tasks – even if they are de facto perfor-
med in theatre – have not been shaped as a separate
category of tasks within ESDP activities of civilian crisis
management. Within existing categories, activities of
policing and those within the framework of establish-
ment of rule of law are obviously related, though, to
human rights and will be explained in greater detail
in the following. In late 2006, human rights expertise
was included in the job descriptions of personnel identi-
fied in the framework of the Civilian Headline Goal 2008.
1.4.2.1 Policing
In essence, it has been widely accepted that the neces-
sary precondition for sustainable peace and security is
that law and order be linked with an adequate judi-
cial system. In the long-term process of structurally
rebuilding a country, police and judicial systems are
required to guarantee justice,103 which the government
in post-conflict societies is often incapable of providing
– particularly when measured against international
human rights standards. Thus, international policing
largely involves encouraging civilian policing that re-
spects human rights, while police reform constitutes
one important aspect of the reconstruction process of
the security system. The latter was recognised by the
UN in the 1990s as a principal element in the rebuilding
of state structures in post-conflict societies. Since then,
the EU has also developed into an important interna-
tional actor that sends international police into crisis
areas.104 It regards its police missions as a means to
advance security sector reform in support of peace in
target countries through the dissemination of “best
European policing practices”,105 and holds the view
that international policing plays a crucial role in esta-
blishing stability in post-conflict situations – situations
in which only a democratic, human rights-oriented po-
lice force is capable of safeguarding the implementa-
tion of a peace process.106 Thus civilian policing has
assumed a leading role in improving EU Crisis Response. 
Whereas earlier UN police missions in post-conflict
situations operated according to the so-called SMART
concept,107 today five areas can be roughly differentia-
ted in terms of the tasks and mandates of policing ope-
rations: monitoring and advising, training, local re-
form, building a new force, and executive policing. In
the majority of missions, civilian police (CIVPOL) are
unarmed and do not have executive powers (unlike the
military police). For the implementation of a peace
process to have any prospect of success, the police
must show that they can gain the trust of all parts of
the community.108 As John McFarlane, researcher on
Australian international policing, states, “the influence
and effectiveness of CivPol is based on moral authority
rather than the threat of force“.109
1.4.2.2 Rule of Law
Policing reform, however, is of little value when the
judicial system is corrupt and is not based on a system
of rule of law, since the absence or corruption of na-
tional judicial and legal capacity not only represents a
cause of conflict, but also an obstacle to a sustainable
resolution.110 Consequently, judicial reform – as an im-
perative component of post-conflict reconstruction –
must also be included in the reconstruction process of
a crisis-torn society. It is important that “reform does
not require creating an ideal society or advanced
democracy, but it does require functional mechanisms
to deal with abuses of authority within the public secu-
rity system”.111 In order for human rights to be effective,
they have to be protected on the basis of the rule of law
by means of institutional structures.112
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norms and standards.” UN Document S/2006/616, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post Conflict
Societies, Report of the Secretary General, 23 August 2004, 4. 
The EU made rule of law a priority,113 and has elabo-
rated a concept for missions in this field.114 At the
Göteborg European Council two generic concepts of
rule of law missions were elaborated: “Strengthening
the rule of law” missions and “Substitution for local
judiciary/legal system” operations. In the first case per-
sonnel in the field of rule of law are deployed essentially
to educate, train, monitor and advise with the aim of
bringing the local legal system up to international stan-
dards, in particular in the field of human rights. This in-
cludes technical assistance, advice on institutions rela-
ted to capacity building (training, education, and
standard setting), monitoring and mentoring of per-
sonnel, and the application of legislation and adminis-
trative procedures. Substitution missions for the local
judiciary system, on the other hand, involve the de-
ployment of personnel to carry out executive functions,
notably where local structures are failing. The objective
here is to consolidate the rule of law in a crisis situa-
tion in order to restore public order and security. These
missions thus concern the functions of the courts, the
prosecution system and the running of prisons as well
as the provision of defence lawyers.115 The general ob-
jective of both types of mission is “to provide for com-
plete and sustainable judiciary and penitentiary systems
under local ownership and meeting rule of law and
human rights standards in the mission area”.116
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2.1 The Significance of Human Rights in
Terms of Crisis Management Operations
Grave human rights violations often provoke conflict
and humanitarian crises and always aggravate them.
Conflict-related deaths, displacement, and the execu-
tion of prisoners, to mention only three types of incident,
are assaults on fundamental rights. The restriction of
freedom of movement and torture are as frequent in in-
ternal conflicts as the rape of women or girls by soldiers
and forced prostitution, while many conflicts are caused
by the denial of fundamental rights as regards food,
respect for cultural life or participation in society’s de-
cision-making processes. Furthermore, the collapse of
civic institutions and infrastructure, associated with
armed conflict, subverts civil, economic, political and
social rights. In situations of armed conflict, the inter-
dependence of all human rights becomes visible. Respect
for human rights is essential for genuine peace. Help-
ing to guarantee them can accordingly prevent con-
flict arising and stabilise post-conflict situations. With
regard to this potential of human rights, their protection
plays an essential role in such situations, since statis-
tics prove that the risk of renewed escalation and out-
break of violence is ten times higher in a post-conflict
situation than before a war; and although the risk of
falling back into violence decreases within a decade, it
remains significantly higher than in times prior to the
conflict.117 Consequently, human rights concerns are
a key element in peacekeeping,118 and in peacebuilding,119
and should therefore be incorporated into all peace
operations. Ian Martin states in this respect: “I want to
say clearly ... that all my experience teaches me that a
human rights presence in the field, with as much local
outreach as possible, is the most potent tool we have in
the protection of human rights in crisis situations”.120
The building of functioning human rights institutions
will strongly contribute to a sustainable peace. What
Mary Robinson, former UN High Commissioner for Human
Rights, expressed with regard to Kosovo is as true for
any other region in crisis: “Any durable solution to the
crisis in Kosovo will have to be built on a solid founda-
tion of respect for human rights infrastructures, on strong
national and local human rights institutions, and on a
culture of respect for human rights and tolerance.”121
2.2 Human Rights Implications of 
Military Interventions
While the main focus of this study is on the human
rights protection offered by civilian aspects of EU peace
operations, the question arises, nevertheless, whether
and how military operations are related to human
rights. Does the intervention serve human rights? Does
the operation potentially even threaten the civil popu-
lation and their human rights? What are the reasons
behind an EU decision to intervene with military means?
Do human rights play a role within a necessarily com-
plex decision-making process? 
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118 Peacekeeping is the stationing of multi-national troops to guarantee peace by keeping the conflicting parties apart from
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operations. Just as peacemaking it only aims at a “negative peace”. The difference to peacemaking is that the latter describes
use of civilian or military measures (e.g. mediation, sanctions, military intervention) to end the actual fighting. See Schneckener
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120 Martin (1999), 13.
121 Robinson (1999), para. 82.
The very aim of crisis management operations – no
matter whether military or civilian – according to
Hazelzet is “to create stability and foster a safe environ-
ment in which people are respected and free” and to
prevent human rights catastrophes unfolding.122 She
acknowledges, nevertheless, the complexity of reaso-
ning behind a decision for intervention that may be
based on a broad range of considerations. In her view,
three factors could explain the conditions under which
the EU intervenes through an ESDP mission, namely
norms, institutions and interests. While in her opinion
human rights protection ranges among the normative
factors as protection of human rights is a key objective
of the CFSP, she proposes a point of view that it may
be a matter of perception whether it is in our “interest”
to stop human rights atrocities.123
Hazelzet’s deliberations are a first step into a large
field that merits further research. Such an analysis of
EU reasoning behind intervention, however, cannot be
undertaken within the scope of this present study. So
what are the main questions that should be explored
from a human rights perspective?
The notion of “humanitarian intervention” comes into
view here, defined as “the threat or use of force across
state borders by a state or group of states aimed at
preventing or ending widespread and grave violations
of the fundamental human rights of individuals other
than its own citizens, without the permission of the
state within whose territory force is applied”.124 Con-
troversies among politicians and academics continue,
since the debate on this issue raises profound and dif-
ficult legal and moral questions. Potential harms stand
vis-à-vis unverified benefits. However, there is also the
question of alternatives in cases where genocide, ethnic
cleansing or similar horrendous atrocities are already
under way. Undeniably, successful conflict prevention
is in every respect the better solution – but it does not
solve the question of how to react once this chance
has been missed. Thus, the UN Charter clearly recog-
nises that force – under the mandate of a Security
Council Resolution and with a broad international con-
sensus – might be applied in certain circumstances
when all non-violent options have been exhausted and
when it is regarded as the only effective way to protect
civilians. According to a report by the International
Council of Human Rights Policy even most of the NGOs
working on human rights would argue that no necessary
bond exists between pacifism and the defence of human
rights.125 Since the early 1990s, military intervention
has increasingly tended to be regarded as legitimate
in situations were human rights are being abused and
violated. This tendency is accompanied by a broader
internationalisation of defence and security, a develop-
ment of which the ESDP and its military operations
and capabilities are one component.
The EU has not developed a formal set of criteria or an
informal framework for decision making on military
intervention, though. Javier Solana puts military inter-
vention in a context of the “values and principles” of
the EU: “(T)he Union has to be prepared to use military
assets and resources […] The deployment of troops will
only ever be undertaken when the situation absolutely
demands it. But our credibility in being able to offer a
comprehensive response depends on our ability devel-
oping a military crisis management capacity at a Euro-
pean level […]. We are not in the business of doing this
for its own sake. But in support of the values and prin-
ciples for which the European Union is respected world-
wide”.126 The European Security Strategy itself puts
military means in the context of a series of other, more
important tools to protect Europe’s security, and adds
that “in almost every major intervention, military effi-
ciency has been followed by civilian chaos. We need
greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources
to bear in crisis and post-crisis situations”.127 While
declaring the establishment of “the rule of law and
protecting human rights” in connection with other civil
instruments as “the best means of strengthening the in-
ternational order”,128 the ESS does not, however, offer
a framework for decision-making for military (or civil)
interventions. It is not easy to understand the reasons
behind an EU decision in favour of or against a military
intervention. 
The best known and internationally recognised set of
criteria was developed by the International Commission
on Intervention and State Sovereignty in its report “The
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Responsibility to Protect”.129 The Commission argues
that when a sovereign state that has a responsibility to
protect its people from serious harm that may result
from e.g. repression or state failure is unwilling or un-
able to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the
broader international community.130 It asserts six crite-
ria for military intervention: 
Right authority: Security Council authorisation should
be sought in all cases.
Just cause: Only large scale loss of life or large scale
“ethnic cleansing” are considered just cause.
Right intention: The primary purpose of the inter-
vention must be to halt or avert human suffering.
Last resort: Every non-military option for a peaceful
resolution of the crisis has been explored.
Proportional means: The scale and intensity of the
intervention should be the minimum necessary.
Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable
chance of success in averting the suffering.
The Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities un-
dertook a valuable attempt to develop a set of seven
“principles for operations in severe insecurity that apply
to both ends and means” in their report “Human Secu-
rity Doctrine for Europe” (HSD).131 The strengthening of
the EU’s military capabilities is explicitly welcomed in
the HSD in order for the Union to be able to protect the
human rights of those communities who are living in
threatened areas, namely failing states, anywhere in
the world. The Union, the HSD maintains, has this obliga-
tion not only for moral and historical reasons, but also
in order to ensure that Europe can live in security and
peace; otherwise the risk remains that insecurity and
corrupt economies may be exported from failing states
to the European continent.132 But, and this is important,
the HSD also lists a series of requirements (“princi-
ples”) for a justified and qualified intervention: the pri-
macy of human rights, clear political authority, multi-
lateralism, a bottom-up approach, regional focus (to
prevent the spread of violence), the use of legal instru-
ments, and the appropriate use of force. The EU, how-
ever, has not yet endorsed these or any other similar cri-
teria. The adoption of such a catalogue – potentially as
a development of the ESS or as a high ranking policy
paper – would highly increase the transparency and
accountability of EU decisions on military intervention.
Generally, a military operation launched either during
armed conflict itself or in its immediate aftermath may
very well serve highly desirable purposes like protection
of or assistance for the local population. Although these
military protection and assistance initiatives alone can
achieve little beyond temporary containment of a situ-
ation, they may have a substantial impact on the secu-
rity of the local population and thus, at the very least,
on the right to life. Whether by means of security sector
reform (SSR) in military areas or by protection initiatives,
seeking to protect civilians from the violence of armed
conflict through military intervention in the midst of
conflict, to separate combatants (peace enforcement),
to protect safe areas (robust peacekeeping) or to moni-
tor cease-fires (peacekeeping) – military intervention
may be a means of preventing or mitigating conflict
and thus also constitute efforts to protect the funda-
mental human rights of the civilians on the ground.133
While EU interventions are based on these assump-
tions and concepts, an impact assessment of indivi-
dual operations may still show a different reality. Only
evaluations in the field can show whether the Union’s
commitment to its own standards are actually met by
the forces on the ground. 
2.3 Human Rights Tasks in Civilian Crisis
Management Operations 
Human rights tasks in civilian operations have been
carried out by field personnel since the early nineties –
one of the first and prominent examples being the UN
operation ONUSAL in El Salvador. Since then, so-called
human rights monitoring, which in fact includes a
range of different responsibilities, has evolved steadi-
ly and is part of the ongoing activities of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights134. Tasks may include
monitoring the current human rights situation and
publishing reports, monitoring national and local election
processes and monitoring re-integration of ex-com-
batants into civil society. Assisting in activities of hu-
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129 See International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (2001): The Responsibility to Protect. 
130 See ibid.
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manitarian missions, investigating past violations to
ensure perpetrators are brought to justice or developing
human rights promotion, education and public informa-
tion campaigns are further vital tasks to be mentioned.
In addition, the prevention of violations by an active
presence, facilitating conciliation and confidence-build-
ing, local-level conflict-resolution e.g. for the safe and
voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced
persons, or contributing to institution and capacity-buil-
ding through technical assistance programmes, such as
reform of judiciary or police, are tasks carried out in
civilian crisis management operations in order to pro-
tect and promote human rights.135
Constituting essential aspects of peacebuilding, the
human rights tasks most relevant for ESDP operations
will be briefly presented below.
2.3.1 Monitoring 
According to Alston and Weiler “monitoring is an indis-
pensable element in any human rights strategy. Syste-
matic, reliable and focused information is the starting
point for a clear understanding of the nature, extent,
and location of the problems which exist and for the
identification of possible solutions”.136 In essence, hu-
man rights monitoring describes the collection, verifi-
cation, and use of information to address human rights
problems. While its purpose is to achieve an improve-
ment in the human rights situation, it can involve diffe-
rent sets of activities, such as establishing records of past
and/or current human rights violations, making the
general public aware of human rights violations, inter-
vening with the authorities to enforce an adequate re-
sponse to the situation, and reinforcing local capacities
to protect human rights.137 Monitoring functions may
enable operations to alert the international commu-
nity of imminent crises, especially through the identifi-
cation of accelerators of gross human rights abuses, and
to suggest ways to minimise and prevent individual hu-
man rights violations from turning into a larger scale
conflict.138 There are two fundamental principles of
monitoring: impartiality and accuracy. Not only must
monitoring be carried out under these principles, it must
also be perceived as impartial and accurate by the peo-
ple on the ground.139
Essentially, monitoring relates to the human rights obli-
gations of the state in question. This includes exami-
nation of the implementation of the human rights con-
ventions to which the state is party, its national laws
and regulations, and its legal practice.140 Further refe-
rences may be found in the respective peace agree-
ments or memoranda of understanding. In some cases,
the degree of precision regarding the monitoring man-
date makes a big difference – does it, for example, in-
clude a permission to investigate individual cases of
violations?141 Also, monitoring can be effective only if
the follow-up reporting line is clearly established. While
for the reporting line handling individual cases has to
involve relevant officials, another important aspect is
public information on the human rights situation and
potential deteriorations or improvements. This can have
a dramatic influence on behaviour, decisions and even
on territorial movements of the local population. 
However, as stated by Andrew Clapham and Florence
Martin, “monitoring alone [does] not create the local
expertise that needs to remain after the monitors are
long gone”.142 Monitoring, as a reactive strategy, must
be employed concurrently with and feed into more
proactive strategies such as institution-building, which
endeavours to sustain the protection of human rights.143
2.3.2 Institution-Building 
Institution-building embodies a fundamental part of
state- and peacebuilding. It describes assistance to
post-conflict governments in the reform or development
of national police forces, judicial and prison systems,
and political and administrative institutions, and is,
thus, a long-term endeavour.144 Evidently, contributing
to the rule of law and an independent judicial system by
establishing permanent, independent and effective na-
tional institutions for the long-term protection of human
rights through civilian missions clearly fosters human
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rights protection, as does the reinstitution of the rule
of law, including an independent judiciary and fair
criminal justice system.145 An important factor for the
prevention of further violations is the establishment
of an independent national human rights institution or
(and sometimes in addition) an ombudsman institution.
The impact of a field mission on the scope and nature
of the national institution may be limited but poten-
tially it may exert pressure for it to be established and
provide expert advice. 
Normally, institution-building implies inter-agency co-
operation as this is part of development aid. At the UN
level this means UNDP involvement, at the EU level
the key actor in this field is the Commission. Although
this may sound as if it just implies a number of coordi-
nation challenges, in practice it may lead to political
tensions between different approaches because human
rights monitoring is potentially much more confronta-
tional than institution-building where constructive co-
operation with local and national authorities is a con-
dition for common undertakings. Actors in both fields
need to develop a common strategy to ensure that a
feedback loop is built in between monitoring and insti-
tution building-activities.
2.3.3 Civil Society Cooperation and 
Capacity-Building
The term “capacity building” encapsulates basically
two important areas of work: training and human rights
education on the one hand, support for non-govern-
mental organisations on the other hand. Capacity buil-
ding can, inter alia, involve training police officers and
sensitising them to human rights issues, or provide hu-
man rights education to local lawyers and judges in an
effort to prevent unfair trials.146
But the main target group of capacity building is civil
society. Support for Non-Governmental Organisations
(NGOs) may start with validation of their human rights
reports as an important source of information and the
establishment of fora where civil society can present
and discuss matters of human rights concern, but fi-
nancial or logistic support may play a role as well. Hu-
man rights education programmes for the local popu-
lation may range from the establishment of a human
rights radio station or theatre projects up to media-
tion training programmes. Minorities and vulnerable
groups can be supported by training and empower-
ment programs. 
Thus, capacity building is a very important and lasting
contribution which a civilian operation can make, since
the term describes the development of collective as
well as individual capabilities to replace violent conflict
by positive and constructive means of conflict resolution.
Human rights education cuts across all monitoring,
capacity-building and institution-building activities,
which indicates that all these fields are inextricably
intertwined with each other. As already mentioned ear-
lier, all the human rights tasks discussed above are in
some way connected with each other. Hence only those
human rights tasks which are most salient for the re-
spective operation will be discussed in the section on
missions below. 
2.3.4 Gender Units
Of a slightly different character are the so-called gender
units within a mission. Their purpose is the promotion
of gender equality and gender mainstreaming in the
context of ESDP.147 Among other aspects, gender units
are a way of implementation of article 7 of CEDAW,
guaranteeing women participation in political life in
their country. Of course, CEDAW is as relevant for post-
conflict situations as it is in times of peace.148 “Article 7
obliges States parties to take all appropriate measures
to eliminate discrimination against women in political
and public life and to ensure that they enjoy equality
with men in political and public life. The obligation
specified in article 7 extends to all areas of public and
political life […]. The political and public life of a coun-
try is a broad concept”.149 At the same time, CEDAW 
Art. 3 implies a general obligation to undertake gender
mainstreaming measures including legislation, “to en-
sure the full development and advancement of women,
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147 See Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on promoting gender equality and gender mainstreaming in crisis
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for the purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and
enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms
on a basis of equality with men.” As most gender units
serve the purpose of mainstreaming gender aspects into
a mission on all levels, they often do not perform sepa-
rate tasks as listed in chapters 2.3.1 to 2.3.3 but are
there to ensure that monitoring, institution-building,
capacity-building and other, less human-rights-related
tasks of the mission are performed in a such way that
a gender perspective is adequately integrated into all
aspects of the mission. Gender units may have an addi-
tional component that is associated to a gender-ade-
quate management within the mission. A third aspect
may be monitoring the impact of the mission on the lo-
cal population and ensuring gender-conscious handling
of all interaction with the local population.150 UN Gen-
der Units are charged with providing training for staff
to integrate a gender perspective into the various func-
tional areas of peacekeeping. They advise senior mana-
gement on strategies for integrating gender perspec-
tives into policy- and decision-making, work with DDR
units to ensure that the special needs of women are
taken into consideration and promote increased partici-
pation of women in political decision-making processes.
Furthermore, they are active in forming partnerships
with local women’s groups and civil society organisa-
tions and assisting government counterparts to inte-
grate gender perspectives into all aspects of the transi-
tion process.151
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The following overview of ESDP missions aims to high-
light the human rights aspects of the operations. Most
mandates of ESDP operations do not explicitly refer to
human rights as an objective of the intervention, but
this is about to change.152 Efforts are now being made
by the EU to integrate human rights advisors on the
ground in all current and future operations. The aim is
to deploy full time advisors, but due to this being work
in progress, in many operations only focal points have so
far been established. EUSEC DRC and EUPOL Kinshasa
in the DR Congo, the Eujust Lex mission in Iraq and the
planning team for the new mission in Kosovo have such
points of contact while the most recent mission, EUFOR
RD Congo had two Human Rights Focal Points, one in
the Operation Headquarters near Berlin, the other one
in Kinshasa. Furthermore, EUFOR RD Congo was the first
EU operation ever to have a full time Gender Advisor in
the field. 
Many, if not all EU missions take place in a very complex
and conflictual environment and, within the frame-
work of the following overview, it is not possible to
summarise even broadly the background to all the con-
flicts where intervention has taken place. In addition,
the international media reports scantily on EU mis-
sions – mostly you find a lot of comments by the media
and the NGO community before a mission is launched,
but once an operation takes up its work and even works
well, public interest fades. Updates on mission suc-
cesses can thus, if at all, often only be found through
EU sources or a handful of NGOs.
3.1 Decision-Making
A few words should be said about the decision-making
process that takes place prior to an operation – within
the structural framework described under 1.2. The de-
cision-making process concerning the launch of an ESDP
operation is based on democratic principles. Every mem-
ber state has an equal voice in the various decision-
making committees involved.153 Before the initiation 
of a crisis management operation, an analysis of the
imminent crisis situation is undertaken.154 If this analy-
sis reveals that a crisis situation indeed exists, the PSC
begins to debate whether and in what way the Union
will contribute to the stabilisation of the respective re-
gion. Subsequently, the PSC requests the preparation of
an advice by the appropriate Council Working Groups.155
While the Situation Centre reports on the situation on
a daily basis, the Council Secretariat, which comprises
military and civilian personnel, tackles the planning of
the operation. Furthermore, member states engage in
discussing in what way they can contribute to the un-
dertaking. A joint fact-finding mission of the Council
Secretariat and Commission sent to the country in
question, meanwhile, provides recommendations on po-
tential risks and the nature of the mission.
Next, after reassessing the different advices and reports,
the PSC recommends to the Council whether or not to
launch a crisis management operation. Under the lea-
dership of the PSC, which instructs the SG/HR and the
Secretariat to work out a Crisis Management Concept
3
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(CMC), such a Concept is drawn up. It outlines the EU’s
political interests, objectives and major strategic op-
tions for responding to the crisis. After the Secretariat
has developed and presented a draft CMC based on
the conclusions of the fact-finding mission, the PSC
discusses the CMC, agrees on it and presents it to
COREPER and the Council. COREPER discusses it again
before the Council approves the CMC. Then the Coun-
cil instructs the PSC to draw up strategic options. 
The PSC then tasks the EUMC with drawing up strate-
gic military options (MSO) and CIVCOM with developing
strategic options for civilian and police action (CSO/
PSO). CIVCOM cooperates with the Council Secretariat
and the EUMC receives advice from the EUMS. All SOs
are then forwarded to the PSC to which the Commis-
sion now presents accompanying measures. After eva-
luating them the PSC forwards the draft decisions on
MSO, PSO and CSO to COREPER/Council. The Council
formally decides on the Joint Action which includes
the mission mandate and the decision to act. A head of
mission/operation commander is appointed, and a Con-
cept of Operation (CONOPS) and Operation Plan (OPlan)
are developed. The procedure of the drawing up of
both, the concept and the OPlan, is similar to the one
for Joint Action. The drafts follow similar channels with
all the steps from the PSC to CIVCOM or EUMC (de-
pending on the type of mission), and then back to the
PSC and the Council for adoption. The head of mission/
operation commander are involved in the development
of the OPlan and the EUMS has a specific role in wri-
ting the “Initiating Military Directive” which trans-
forms the political-military into a military document
that military staff can use to plan operations.156 A clear
exit strategy will also be designed. When CONOPS and
OPlan have been approved by the Council, the Council
finally decides to launch the operation, and the mem-
ber states commence to send their contributions. The
Union needs a minimum of five days after the Council
decision to be present on the ground.157
In 2003, this modus operandi was applied for the first
time ever. Two military operations were launched –
one in Europe (Concordia) and one in Central Africa
(Artemis) – along with two civilian missions in the
Balkans (EUPM and Proxima). By now the EU has com-
pleted seven operations altogether (Concordia, Artemis,
Proxima, EUJUST Themis, EUPAT, EUFOR RD Congo,
AMM), while nine are still ongoing, and two new ones are
in the planning phase (EUPT Kosovo and a mission in
Afghanistan).158 The spectrum of operations covers
small-scale civilian operations in support of the rule
of law (as in Georgia, EUJUST Themis) and medium-
scale military missions such as taking over the main
peace stabilisation role from NATO’s SFOR mission in
Bosnia and Herzegovina (Althea). The geographical
range of these EU operations is remarkable, encom-
passing not only Europe (e.g. Macedonia), but also
Africa (e.g. Sudan), Asia (Indonesia) and the Middle
East (e.g. Palestinian Territories). In the following chap-
ters the individual ESDP missions are examined, fo-
cusing on the main human rights aspects. The missions
have been divided into military and civilian operations,
although obviously military missions include civilian
personnel while some civilian missions also involve a
small number of military experts. 
3.2 Military Operations: Military Protec-
tion, Assistance and Security Sector 
Reform Missions
The EU has launched five military operations since
2003: Operation Concordia in Macedonia, Artemis in
the DR Congo, EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina, the EU Security Sector Reform Mission in the DRC
EUSEC DR Congo, and the 2006 mission EUFOR RD 
Congo in Kinshasa. 
3.2.1 Concordia 
The EU’s very first military peacekeeping mission, ope-
ration Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (fYROM), was launched on 31 March 2003,
at the request of the fYROM government.159 Concordia
took over from the NATO-led Allied Harmony force and
ran until 15 December 2003. It consisted of a staff of
roughly 350 with access to NATO capabilities and as-
sets,160 and its core objective was to improve the over-
all security situation in Macedonia and contribute fur-
ther to a stable and secure environment to allow the
implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework
Agreement.161 A series of tasks were defined in the OPLan:
evaluation of the security situation and reconnaissance
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of the road network and other areas by helicopter, vehi-
cles or on foot, meetings with civilian and military au-
thorities and international organisations, and systema-
tic encounters with the population (civil advisory groups,
town councils, non-political gatherings), to name just
a few.162 According to Colonel Pierre Augustin, EUFOR
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and the Operation
Representative from France, the operation “completely
fulfilled the mission for which EUFOR had been consti-
tuted”.163 However, he also states that EUFOR lacked two
high value-added capabilities: a team dedicated to infor-
mation operations to release weekly messages into the
area of operation, and legal analysis, such as a specia-
list in legal investigation or in criminal intelligence to
focus legal scrutiny on the situation.164 According to an
International Crisis Group Report, in spite of some prac-
tical operational difficulties, Concordia could be count-
ed as a success, since it helped to build confidence and
stability in the region.165
On the subject of human rights aspects within the mis-
sion tasks, human rights were not explicitly mentioned
in the mandate. The provision of a visible military pre-
sence, particularly in areas of potential instability and
ethnic tension, in order to support stability and confi-
dence building, the focus on observation of the
Weapons Collection Program in the field, and the sup-
port of international community monitors, however,
contributed to the stabilisation and improvement of
the security situation in Macedonia. Stabilising the se-
curity situation in turn also has an immediate rele-
vance for the protection and promotion of the human
rights situation of the Macedonian population. 
3.2.2 Artemis and EUFOR RD Congo
The withdrawal of Ugandan troops in April 2003 led to
a deteriorating security situation marked by gross vio-
lations of human rights in the Ituri province of the DRC
that endangered the peace process.166 Thus the EU,
responding to an appeal by the UN Secretary-Gene-
ral,167 launched an Interim Emergency Multinational
Force (IEMF), the Military Operation in the DRC, ope-
ration Artemis, on 12 June 2003.168 The operation was
the EU’s first deployment outside Europe, its first mili-
tary mission to be implemented entirely autonomously
outside NATO, and also its first operation under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter.169 It was to function as the bridg-
ing element between two phases of MONUC,170 and
to stabilise the situation in Bunia, Ituri’s capital, prior to
the arrival of a reinforced UN presence in September
2003.171 The mission was tasked to contribute to sta-
bilising security conditions and improving the humani-
tarian situation in Bunia, and to ensure the protection
of the airport, of the internally displaced persons in
the camps in Bunia and if required, the safety of the
civilian population, UN personnel and humanitarian
presence.172 While the IEMF was able to stabilise the
security and humanitarian situation in Bunia,173 and was
as such certainly relevant for the human rights protec-
tion of the resident population, the situation in the
surrounding area remained extremely unstable. There
atrocities continued, since the mission’s limited man-
date as to the area of operation had the effect that
violent aggression against civilians was pushed out of
town, but not out of the region.174 In addition, MONUC
was unable to benefit from assets of Artemis.175 Despite
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excellent cooperation between MONUC and Artemis,
none of its staff were willing to re-hat with MONUC
after the EU mission had closed.176 According to a re-
port by amnesty international, human rights abuses
persisted in 2005 and 2006,177 and the EU had and still
has to confront allegations that not enough effort has
been made towards a sustainable improvement of the
conditions in the DRC,178 notwithstanding three further
ESDP operations following Artemis including the most
recent one, EUFOR RD Congo,179 launched to secure
the election period in 2006. 
The issue of motives for and legitimacy, effectiveness
and sustainability of ESDP missions in general, and of
the EU missions in Africa and the DRC in particular has
not lost any of its topicality in debates and discussions
which include as much criticism as praise. While this
debate cannot be discussed in detail here, the necessi-
ty for a coherent and sustainable EU intervention in
DRC must be underlined. An overall and coherent con-
cept to (re)build and transform the country’s institu-
tions, essential services and infrastructure, including
the justice, health and educational sectors is needed. In
this regard the considerable efforts undertaken by the
EU Commission together with the ESDP operations
seem to go into the right direction.180 Thus the effec-
tiveness of the ESDP missions in the DRC must also be
considered in the context of the overall EU engage-
ment in the Congo. However, also taking into account
activities of other international organisations and the
UN in particular, ESDP operations could play an es-
sential role within a coherent strategy – especially if
they are planned and undertaken as an opportunity to
improve the human rights situation in the country, not
least the situation of economic, social and cultural
rights.181 In general, focusing on and encouraging hu-
man rights components in the missions’ work would
have a positive effect on the sustainability of the mission’s
achievements. The deployment of any mission thus pro-
vides an enormous opportunity and a chance to further
the peace process by improving the human rights si-
tuation. 
The autonomous EU-led military operation EUFOR RD
Congo, which was one of the more controversial opera-
tions, was deployed in accordance with the mandate set
out in UN Security Council Resolution 1671 (2006) of
25 April. Its execution ended on 30 November 2006. It
was tasked to support MONUC during the period en-
compassing the elections to stabilise the situation if
required by MONUC, to contribute to the protection
of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence
in the areas of its deployment, to contribute to airport
protection in Kinshasa, and to execute operations of
limited character in order to extract individuals in dan-
ger.182 According to Gutièrrez, the deployment of EUFOR
must be seen in a wider context which includes the
UN Mission MONUC and EUPOL Kinshasa, the EU’s po-
lice mission in the DRC. He states that “EUFOR’s presen-
ce strengthened MONUC and the EU’s global action in
the DRC”.183
Although human rights were not mentioned in the
mandate, EUFOR RD Congo was highly relevant for hu-
man rights protection for the population in the region
of Kinshasa. The guarantee of a secure environment
for the Congolese population to elect its own govern-
ment surely contributes to the stabilisation of the peace
process and the protection not only of the physical
safety of the people but also of their ability to exercise
political rights. It was launched in support of MONUC,
the UN Mission in the DRC, during the election process
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and was to work in close cooperation with the UN Mis-
sion, which has a distinct Human Rights Division. This
division is active in investigations in order to ensure
that perpetrators of past human rights abuses are
brought to justice. Its mandate also included assis-
tance to the former Government of National Unity and
Transition in the promotion and protection of human
rights, with particular attention to woman, children
and vulnerable persons, providing advice and assis-
tance concerning human rights legislation, and moni-
toring and documenting human rights violations.184
EUFOR RD Congo was the first EU operation ever to
have a full time Gender Advisor in the field. With the
establishment of this function it was intended to make
gender issues fully operational and to integrate a gen-
der perspective into the ordinary being the work on all
levels of the mission.185 An important priority was the
strong focus on women´s rights. Within the different
units and staff branches in Kinshasa and Gabon 20
Gender Focal Points were established who closely co-
operated with the Gender Advisor. The Gender Advisor
held more than 20 meetings with local women's orga-
nisations to inform them about the mission, to obtain
information e.g. on Congolese Actors for victims of
rape and sexual abuse by them and to support them.
The Gender Advisor´s activities included training of 250
participants of the operation, the edition of weekly
gender reports, contribution to the Soldier's Card186 ,
the establishment of reporting lines for cases of sexu-
al violence and cooperation with MONUC. 
Two Human Rights Focal Points (HRFP) were assigned
for the operation.187 Being the Legal Advisors of the
Operation Headquarters (OHQ, Potsdam, Germany) and
Field Headquarters (FHQ, Kinshasa, DRC), they were res-
ponsible for all operational legal issues, in particular
the Law of Armed Conflict, Human Rights Law, and the
interpretation and application of UN Security Council
resolutions, international treaties and customary inter-
national law in all operational settings. In addition, the
Legal Advisor in the FHQ Kinshasa acted as Gender
Officer. Taking part in the whole planning process from
the first core planning team meeting to the final ver-
sion of the Operations Plan, the HRFPs were able to
ensure respect for human rights in the specific direc-
tives for EUFOR (e.g. in its Soldier’s Card), to establish
an efficient reporting system to control the good con-
duct of EUFOR RD Congo and to assess the human rights
situation in the area of operations. 
In the preparation phase, the EU OHQ HRFP conducted
several human rights training events addressing senior
operations staff and EUFOR RD Congo personnel in order
to make them qualified multipliers in Libreville, Gabon
and Kinshasa, DRC, also in cooperation with the res-
pective specialist staff of MONUC and the Gender Advi-
sor. In addition, OHQ EUFOR RD Congo produced a mixed
family of human rights documents. 
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The “SOLDIER’s CARD EUFOR RD Congo”188 consti-
tutes a novelty. It was initialized by the Gender Adviser
and the Human Rights Focal Point OHQ and was deve-
loped in cooperation with the Cultural Adviser, the Po-
litical Adviser and the representatives of the military
functional areas. The individual EUFOR soldier on the
ground was equipped with that pocket card providing
guidelines under the following headings: Mission, Gen-
eral Rules for the Use of Force, Specific Rules to open
fire, Self-Defence, General Rules of Behaviour/Human
Rights/Gender Issues, Medical Issues.
. . .
5. GENERAL RULES OF BEHAVIOUR/ 
HUMAN RIGHT/GENDER ISSUES
Any violation of this Soldier's Card will be considered
as serious misconduct. SEA will be investigated and
may lead to disciplinary measures being taken, including
suspension, immediate repatriation or summary dis-
missal. EUFOR personnel are obliged to report any con-
cerns regarding SEA and abuse by a colleague through
the established reporting mechanisms.
a. General Rules of Behaviour
(1) Be impartial and do not volunteer any political or
social opinions specifically on political persons, po-
litical parties or ethnic groups.
(2) Be firm. In case of tension, talk to the people.
(3) Always wear uniform or approved attire.
(4) Do not give anything to children. If you want to
give something, give it to an adult (mother, chief).
(5) Never walk alone outside the Field Camp.
(6) Do not give any interviews to media unless you are
ordered to do so.
(7) Be polite but determined, and treat everybody in a
way you would like to be treated.
(8) Respect local authorities.
(9) Traffic in RDC is dangerous. Watch out for children.
b. Human Rights' Core Points
(1) Transfer of detained persons is allowed only to au-
thorities who are specifically designated by EUFOR
RD Congo.
(2) Report all observations regarding violation of Human
Rights via your chain of command.
(3) Document all observations regarding violation of
Human Rights.
(4) Protection of civilians under imminent threat of
physical violence in the areas of your deployment is
part of your mandate.
(5) Take care for particularly vulnerable groups (i.e.
women, children).
(6) You are personally responsible for respecting and
promoting Human Rights.
c. Gender Issues
Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse (SEA; Sexual ex-
ploitation: Any actual or attempted abuse of a position
of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual
purposes, including profiting monetarily, socially, or
politically; Sexual Abuse: Actual or threatened physical
intrusion of a sexual nature, whether by force or under
unequal or coercive conditions) are acts of unaccept-
able behaviour and prohibited conduct for all EUFOR
personnel. SEA damages the image and integrity of the
EUFOR operation in RDC and erodes confidence and
trust in the operation.
lt is strictly prohibited for all EUFOR personnel to en-
gage in:
1) Any act of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation, or any
other form of sexually humiliating, degrading or ex-
ploitative behaviour.
2) Any type of sexual activities with children (persons
under 18 years of age). Mistaken belief in the age of
a person is no excuse.
3) Use of children or adults to procure sexual activities
from others.
4) Exchange of money, employment, goods or Services
for sex with prostitutes or others.
5) Any sexual favour in exchange of assistance pro-
vided to the beneficiaries of such assistance.
6) Visits to brothels or places, which are declared off-
limits.
d. Child soldiers
Children who show a threatening posture are liable to
measures by EUFOR, in accordance with the Rules of
Engagement (ROE). Examples for such a threatening
posture can be:
1) Using Force
2) Handling weapons in public
3) Participation in organized armed deployment
4) Otherwise posing a threat to EUFOR.
In these cases, they should be disarmed, if possible,
and detained, if deemed necessary. Children have to
be separated from adult detainees. If there is any doubt
regarding the age of detainees, they will be consid-
ered as children. Information about armed groups or
armed forces enrolling or using child soldiers shall be
reported.
. . .
188 “The Soldier’s Card EUFOR RD Congo”, extracts provided by Wolfgang Burzer, see footnote 182
There were hardly any major outbreaks of violence in
the months between and following the two phases of
the election. According to Kinzel this shows that the
mandate of EUFOR RD Congo has proven to be appro-
priate despite its limitations regarding the mission area
(around Kinshasa) and the tasks of the operations. Still,
the question whether the mission withdrew too early
remains unanswered.189
3.2.3 EUFOR Althea 
In Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) the EU deployed its
largest military ESDP mission to date, operation EUFOR
Althea, on 2 December 2004 through Council Joint Ac-
tion of 12 July 2004,190 following the decision by NATO
at the Istanbul summit in June 2004 to end the SFOR
mission in BiH. This ongoing operation is a UN-man-
dated Chapter VII mission and a Berlin Plus opera-
tion.191 A total of 33 countries are contributing to the
EUFOR military presence of operation Althea with an
approximately 7,000-strong EU force,192 reduced to
2,500 by the decision on transition taken on 27 Febru-
ary 2007.193 The mission takes place in an environment
where several regional and international actors are ope-
rating. The main responsibility for human rights is en-
trusted to the OSCE mission. 
In addition to its primary mission of providing deter-
rence, reassurance and a safe and secure environment,
Althea is also tasked to provide assistance to the fight
against organised crime and to offer capacity-building
for local authorities and law enforcement agencies. 
These tasks are in line with the European Security Strate-
gy which declares that “(r)estoring good government to
the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the au-
thorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the
most effective ways of dealing with organised crime
within the EU”.194
At the beginning Althea was criticised for its narrow-
ly defined mandate focusing too much on organised
crime,195 and for including monitoring tasks even
though the EU already had two further missions in BiH
which carried out monitoring related to security and
law enforcement issues (a non-ESDP Monitoring Mis-
sion EUMM and the EU Police Mission EUPM). The In-
ternational Crisis Group said that by launching Althea
Brussels aimed “for a mission which was doomed to
success by its own lack of ambition,”196 and that the
motives for the deployment of EUFOR Althea had much
more to do with the eagerness of the Union to boost its
credibility as a security actor than with the actual se-
curity situation in BiH.197 Javier Solana declared in
2001 that the Balkans were “a testcase for Europe’s
enhanced Common Foreign and Security Policy,”198 and
one year earlier he had already affirmed that “the
Balkans has shown that the European Union can no
longer remain a force for peace simply through exam-
ple. It has also to be forthright in defending the basic
values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law
on which it is founded”.199
Despite the initial assumption that Althea might above
all be a test case for the capabilities of ESDP and CFSP,
a memorandum of the Interparliamentary European
Security and Defence Assembly (by Milos Budin) on
“Public Opinion and the Althea Mission” reports various
activities of Althea in areas relevant for human rights,
although the mission’s mandate does not directly refer
to human rights. That includes especially support to
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugos-
lavia (ICTY) and relevant authorities including the de-
tention of persons indicted for war crimes.200 Amnesty
International called in 2004 on the EU to ensure that
EUFOR Althea actively seeks those indicted by the ICTY
for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humani-
ty,201 after the organisation had accused SFOR of a ran-
ge of human rights violations including unlawful deten-
tion and had urged the EU to make sure these practices
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were discontinued by EUFOR Althea.202 The report by
Milos Budin of 2006 indicates that EUFOR “demon-
strated its commitment to the ICTY mandate”.203 EUFOR
has collected intelligence on criminal networks suppor-
ting war crimes indictees and carried out search opera-
tions and attempts to apprehend fugitives.
Furthermore EUFOR is involved in defence reform di-
rectly and jointly with the UNDP, the OSCE Mission to
BiH and the BiH armed forces, and in particular in the
arms destruction programme.204
EUFOR also helped to establish a demining coordination
section in the BiH Ministry of Defence as part of the de-
fence reform process.205 Joint demining operations are
particularly important for promoting the safe return
of refugees and internally displaced people (IDP). In
addition, EUFOR contributes to creating the conditions
for sustainable return through Civil-Military Coopera-
tion (CIMIC). Networking with international organisa-
tions, the civilian population, government bodies and
NGOs, EUFOR activities contribute to a large number of
projects in infrastructural, humanitarian, economic and
administrative fields.206
In conclusion, EUFOR actively contributes to an environ-
ment in Bosnia and Herzegovina that is conducive to
establishing a human rights culture for the people. This
is confirmed by opinion polls showing that people view
the Althea mission as essential to security and stability
and also as a means of improving policies on education,
employment, visas and ultimately of integration into
the European institutions.207
With regard to the mission’s inclusion of a gender pers-
pective, however, the study by Batt and Valenius on
the gender aspects in ESDP missions clearly illustrates
that a gender perspective has not been incorporated into
the work of the mission. Although, according to the
authors, mission personnel showed positive attitudes
towards greater participation by women, very little
knowledge on gender mainstreaming seemed to exist.
Furthermore, the study states that the problem of sexual
harassment was persisting. Female soldiers are espe-
cially susceptible because of the small percentage of
overall mission staff they represent in EUFOR – at the
time of the study 5.88 % (April 2006) – and their sub-
ordinate position in the masculine military culture.208
Because female soldiers often would not know to whom
to file the complaint, sexual harassment cases often
went unreported.209
3.2.4 EUSEC DR Congo 
Another type of operation, the Union’s first Security
Sector Reform (SSR) Mission, EUSEC DRC, was launched
in June 2005 following an official request by the Con-
golese government. EUSEC DRC is not a military opera-
tion of the same kind as Concordia or Artemis, which
include the deployment of military forces. It is a mission
which is, in essence, concerned with capacity building.
In order to act as advisors, military experts are assigned
to key posts within the Congolese administration, e.g.
to the Minister of Defence, to the Chief of the Army and
to the Military Structure for Integration.210 With the
help of these experts the mission is mandated to back
the reform of the security sector and “provide the Con-
golese authorities responsible for security with advice
and assistance, while taking care to promote policies
compatible with human rights and international huma-
nitarian law, democratic standards and the principles of
good governance, transparency and respect for the rule
of law”.211 Human rights are, hence, specifically raised
in the mandate.
The practical purpose of the mission is to assist the
authorities in setting up a Congolese national army.
Thereby all former belligerents “have to be integrated
into the brigades that will be deployed on the ground” as
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stated by General Pierre Michel Joana, Head of EUSEC.212
EUSEC’s efforts (as well as efforts of the UN and third
countries) to reform the Congolese army have had mixed
results. While a large number of combatants have not
yet been through the armed forces reorganisation
process, the existing brigades are under-equipped and
under-staffed.213 MONUC’s July 2006 Human Rights
Report reveals that although there are examples of
positive conduct, “the routine use of physical violence
against civilians, including summary executions, beatings
and rape, committed by FARDC soldiers […] is reported
wherever the army is deployed”.214 The International
Crisis Group has very recently stated that “integrated
brigades are deployed without the necessary resources
or equipment and often resort to taxing and abusing
the local population. As a result, the army is still the
largest human rights abuser.”215
However, as indicated by an earlier International Crisis
Group Report, EUSEC has achieved an important coor-
dinating role in army reform. EUSEC’s Chain of Pay-
ments Project whereby the mission provided military
advisors to check the payment flow at key points is
potentially one of the most essential contributions of
the operation.216
As all EU missions in the DRC, EUSEC DRC was to work
in close cooperation with MONUC, the UN Mission in the
DRC.217 EUSEC DRC has been extended until 30 June 2007.
3.3 The EU’s Civilian-Military Supporting
Action AMIS EU 
The international community considers the Darfur con-
flict to be one of the world’s worst current humanitarian
crises. Starting from two 2004 UN Security Council re-
solutions, the UN mandated a fully-fledged peace support
mission in Sudan (UNMIS) acting under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter, with a military and a civil component.
This mission has a considerable human rights compo-
nent. In addition, the African Union established a mission
to monitor the 2004 Humanitarian Ceasefire Agree-
ment, to assist in confidence building and to secure
the protection of civilian and humanitarian operations,
in its present shape called Amis II. In response to a re-
quest by the African Union (AU), the EU established
the EU civilian-military AMIS EU Supporting Action
(AMIS EU) on 18 July 2005 to support the AU Amis II
mission in the Darfur region of Sudan.218 On the same
day, a Special Representative for Sudan was appoint-
ed.219 In view of the scale of abuses to which civilians
have been subjected in Darfur, his mandate incorpo-
rated specific attention to human rights with a special
focus on the rights of children and women. Established
to support the AU and its political, military and police
efforts to address the crisis in Darfur, AMIS EU com-
prises both a civilian and a military component.
The military element covers various types of assistance,
such as providing planning and technical assistance,
additional military observers and strategic and tactical
transportation, and training a contingent of ob-
servers.220 The deployment of trainers and advisors will
help the AU strengthen its civilian policing capacity.
By engaging in these actions, EU AMIS aims to support
AMIS II in its endeavours to observe the cease-fire and
to protect civilians and humanitarian operations. The
civilian component provides police advisors, training
of CIVPOL personnel, and support for the development
of a police unit within the Secretariat of the AU. 
According to an International Crisis Group report from
2005, EU officials acknowledged that the support by
the EU to AMIS has entailed a steep learning curve for
the EU as well as the AU, and that the results from the
EU-AU relationship in Darfur “have been mixed, though
generally positive”.221
The EU has stressed on several occasions the impor-
tance it attaches to human rights protection in the re-
gion, not only through the establishment of the Special
Representative and his human rights brief but also
through strong support of measures to punish human
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rights violations in the Darfur region. Even if this is
not specifically mentioned in the mandate of AMIS EU
– the Council Joint Action only refers in general terms
to human rights of women and children – training of
police officers and the development of a police unit
can potentially contribute effectively to human rights
protection. 
AMIS EU has been extended for six months from 1 Janu-
ary 2007.222
3.4 Civilian Operations 
Since January 2003 the EU has launched eleven civil-
ian operations on three continents with tasks ranging
from monitoring the implementation of a peace process
to advice and assistance in police, border monitoring
and rule of law sectors.
3.4.1 Police Operations 
3.4.1.1 EUPM 
The promotion of human rights is a major theme for
conflict prevention and post-conflict situations and
runs through every police mission. The very first ESDP
crisis management operation, the EU Police Mission in
Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), was launched in Janu-
ary 2003.223 With 500 international civilian police offi-
cers it followed on from the UN’s International Police
Task Force (IPTF) established under the Paris/Dayton
Agreement in 1995.224 When the initial mandate of
three years (EUPM I) expired at the end of 2005, the EU
agreed to a refocused mandate for a scaled-down EUPM
(EUPM II).225
The mandate of EUPM I focused on enhancing BiH
state-level security institutions and developing middle
and senior level management within these. Aiming to
address the whole range of rule of law aspects, EUPM’s
priorities were return of refugees, the development of
police independence and accountability, security, com-
bating organised crime, and institution- and capacity-
building at management level.226 These objectives were
pursued through the following programme areas: crimi-
nal policing, criminal justice, international affairs, police
administration, public order and security, State Border
Service and State Information and Protection Agency.227
However, EUPM has been heavily criticised for having
a weak and premature mandate and lacking effective-
ness.228 The International Crisis Group (ICG) argued in
2005 that “no matter what criteria are used to asses
EUPM performance, the indicators are depressing”.229
According to Susan E. Penksa some police officers had
at the beginning been sent to BiH without any pre-
deployment training while all officers were sent into the
field without implementation guidelines or assessment
protocols.230 Many officers sent to EUPM were under-
qualified and lacked competence and sufficient English
language skills,231 while there was also a lack of standard
operating procedures, particularly with reporting struc-
tures.232 According to a report by the ICG, the Bosnian
police regarded the EUPM as “a laughing stock”.233 In
2005 extremely counterproductive tension arose bet-
ween EUFOR Althea and EUPM I and risked undermining
the credibility of both missions in the eyes of the local
population. EUPM had clearly acquired a negative repu-
tation among the Bosnian population.234 The tension
was triggered because EUPM I officials were advised
to increase their trust of the local police and transfer
more authority to them, whereas EUFOR officers were
told exactly the opposite.235 This illustrates the lack of
coherence between the mandates of the two operations
and the working procedures of EUFOR and EUPM. Sure-
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ly, Penksa says, “many of the planning mistakes and
delays experienced in EUPM I were simply part of the EU
learning curve in designing, planning and running a
large police mission”.236
Nevertheless EUPM I has also made some important
contributions by establishing a credible court police force
and a crime-stoppers hotline, and assisting in preven-
ting human trafficking. (The study by Batt and Valenius
on gender mainstreaming in the missions in BiH obser-
ves, however, that “gender-specific issues such as human
trafficking, sexual and domestic violence are not con-
sidered important enough issues to be tackled in the
context of security” and criticises that local women’s
groups were not consulted sufficiently.237 The Council
drew the consequences and has re-adjusted the policy
of the mission.)
The mission engaged in Returnee Forums (information
and service points for returnees) and furthered the deve-
lopment of state-level agencies such as the Ministry of
Security and the State Border Service.238 Furthermore,
its help in enhancing the institutionalisation of the
BiH State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) as
a police agency to fight organised crime was of enor-
mous importance239. 
Moreover, the lessons learnt from the EUPM I experi-
ence seem to have been taken into consideration in
the current EUPM II. For this new phase of EUPM the
OPlan has been revised and the mandate renegotiated.
It became operational in 2006 and now focuses on
supporting the local police in the fight against organi-
sed crime, conducting inspections and monitoring of
police operations and supporting the implementation
of police restructuring.240 In 2005 EUPM, EUFOR and
the EUSR for BiH agreed on a number of principles to
further their cooperation before a set of common Ope-
rational Guidelines for EUPM-EUFOR support for the
fight against organised crime was adopted in 2006 to
adjust the roles of both missions.241
In EUPM’s mandate the abovementioned responsibili-
ties are not explicitly connected to human rights. Many
of EUPM’s tasks do however represent – at the very
least – important steps to prepare the ground for a
human rights culture: capacity- and institution-build-
ing in the field of policing and rule of law, and the pro-
tection of refugees. The mission monitors and advises
on all aspects of policing activities, the most important
of which include human trafficking, and supervises the
establishment of local police recruitment. Concerning
the importance of human rights within the mission’s
work, Javier Solana, the High Representative of the 
CFSP, clarified in a letter of 3 December 2002 to Amnesty
International, that:
“A professional, European police service is one that
incorporates a human rights-based approach into all
aspects of its work. In order to do this, the police ser-
vice must reflect those standards in its own structures
and practices. […] For this reason, we will mainstream
a human rights-based approach in our work. All EUPM
colocators will be required to include human rights re-
porting in their reports from the field. In addition, EUPM
will appoint one of its Legal Advisors, based in the
Headquarters in Sarajevo, as the focal point for hu-
man rights issues”.242
EU Council officials accordingly stated that human
rights are to be mainstreamed into the mission’s entire
plan of work, and that in the EUPM’s vision “every police
officer is a human rights officer”.243
3.4.1.2 EUPOL Proxima
The EU’s second police mission under ESDP, EUPOL
Proxima,244 was deployed to Macedonia at the invita-
tion of President Trajkovski – initially from 15 Decem-
ber 2003 to 15 December 2004,245 but later extended
for an additional year.246 In line with the objectives of
the EU-brokered Ohrid Framework Agreement signed on
13 August 2001, Proxima focused on the gradual stabi-
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lisation of the country. The operation, which did not
have an executive mandate,247 had an extremely short
planning period that did not allow the elaboration of
a well-defined mandate. The latter thus developed into
a broad one covering monitoring and advice concerning
all functions in the uniformed, criminal and border po-
lice, the Department of State Security and Counter-
Intelligence, and internal control. It was run to moni-
tor and advise the Macedonian police force, and thereby
support the development of a professional police ser-
vice, to assist the practical implementation of the reform
of the Ministry of Interior and the operational transi-
tion towards a border police. 
According to Brigadier General Jürgen Scholz, former
Head of Mission, Proxima had a strong human rights
focus (not mentioned in the mission’s mandate) which
embraced the human rights tasks of monitoring and
capacity-building.248 In line with its mandate to work
“within a broader rule of law perspective” so-called
Law Enforcement Monitors were deployed – lawyers
who were, on the one hand, concerned with improving
cooperation between all bodies in the criminal justice
system and, on the other hand, with monitoring the
“internal control“ unit. So as to enhance public confi-
dence in the police, one task of the monitors who
worked closely together with the police officers was, for
instance, to assist Internal Control co-locators with
the investigation of complaints concerning police mis-
conduct and to monitor the investigations undertaken
by the newly established Internal Control and Profes-
sional Standards Unit in the Ministry of Interior. The
monitors’ tasks thus encompassed the monitoring of
concrete proceedings, e.g. all cases of investigations
against police officers. Other activities directly linked
to human rights included monitoring the treatment of
detainees in police stations with subsequent reports
to the government and international organisations.249
Being involved in the fight against human trafficking,
Proxima’s main objective in dealing with this matter
was to raise awareness and improve skills in investi-
gating suspected cases. To this purpose workshops were
held and handbooks for officers in the field were pub-
lished.250 The handbooks also described the correct
treatment of victims and initiatives for their support.
Jürgen Scholz confirms that the human rights aspect
found expression in the planning of the operations and
in the work of the mission. Human rights knowledge
was taken into consideration in selection of personnel
and was included in the training. At the time when
Proxima was deployed the EU presence in fYROM exis-
ted alongside various other international organisations
and bilateral actors as is commonplace in peace sup-
port operations. One of the organisations Proxima
worked together with was the OSCE, which was espe-
cially mandated to deal with human rights issues. 
Although Proxima was confronted with enormous chal-
lenges at the beginning of its deployment, due to the
complex environment in which it was placed and the
numerous international actors already present, the for-
mer Head of Mission stresses that huge improvements
were noticed within the work of the Macedonian police,
although of course things remained to be done since
more than two years are necessary for a complete reorien-
tation of police methodology. This view was shared by the
International Crisis Group, which stated in one of its re-
ports that the police reform mandated by Ohrid had made
notable progress;251 Proxima “produced visible results”
and was more successful than EUPM in Bosnia.252
3.4.1.3 EUPOL Kinshasa
Following an official request by the Congolese interim
government and the UN to provide a framework for and
advice to the Integrated Police Unit (IPU) under a Congo-
lese line of command, the EU launched another civilian
Police Mission, EUPOL Kinshasa, in the DRC in 2004.253
Initially the mission, involving a team of about 30 staff,
accompanied the IPU nationwide and assisted it in re-
inforcing the country’s internal security and contri-
buting to ensuring the protection of the state institu-
ESDP Operations and their Human Rights Aspects 
3.4 Civilian Operations 
45
247 Nevertheless, as is usual for such police missions without an executive mandate, PROXIMA had a 30-strong armed Protec-
tion Unit which was tasked to protect or evacuate Proxima’s unarmed police in case of emergency. See Rummel (2005), 24.
248 This and the following information has been drawn from the e-mail interview with Jürgen Scholz on 24 April 2006.  
249 See Internal Control/Law Enforcement Monitoring Programme, Factsheet, Skopje, EUPOL Proxima, June 2004; and
Flessenkemper (2004), 10. 
250 See Scholz (2005), 2.
251 International Crisis Group (2006a), 1.
252 International Crisis Group (2005a), 49. However, according to the report the judicial system remained unreformed and 
dysfunctional. See International Crisis Group (2006a), 1.
253 See CJA 2004/847/CFSP.
3
tions. It serves to monitor and advise the IPU to en-
sure that the IPU acts according to the training re-
ceived in the Academic Centre and according to inter-
national best practice in the field. With respect to the
IPU, which now works in a professional fashion, the EU-
POL Kinshasa has had positive results.254 The training of
the IPU encompasses human rights as a major ele-
ment.255
Since the initial first year, the mission has been exten-
ded twice (until December 2006 and June 2007), while
the mandate has been broadened in order for the mis-
sion to support the security of the Presidential elections
in the DRC in June 2006.256 New tasks also involve 
coordination of the maintenance of law and order in
Kinshasa, and reform of the Congolese National Police.257
The police in the DRC have benefited from the work
of EUPOL Kinshasa. They are comparatively well trained,
although the reputation of the police is still question-
able owing to the fact that they are still heavily invol-
ved in corruption.258
While human rights are, again, not referred to in the
mandate, it can be concluded from reports and official
sources that human rights monitoring, institution-
building and training are important elements of the
mission. It is important to note that for EUPOL Kinshasa
a human rights point of contact has been established. 
3.4.1.4 EUPAT
The EU Police Advisory Team (EUPAT) in the Former Yugos-
lav Republic of Macedonia was established following
the EU’s decision – after the successful completion of
EUPOL Proxima – to move from a crisis management
mission to longer-term support and capacity-building
for the Macedonian police. Its operational phase of six
months began in December 2005. The civilian police
mission was launched to build a bridge between the
end of Proxima and a planned monitoring project funded
by CARDS.259 Thus the objective of EUPAT was to further
support the development of a professional police service
based on European standards within a broader rule of
law perspective.260 The roughly 30 EU police experts
thus mentored the country’s police on priority issues in
the field of border policing, public peace, order and
accountability, and the fight against corruption and
organised crime. Jürgen Scholz, the Head of Mission,
confirmed that the mission was actively contributing to
establishing a human rights culture,261 even though
the mandate did not explicitly raise human rights tasks.
The International Crisis Group proposes the establish-
ment of a new mission by drawing personnel and exper-
tise from Proxima and its successor mission EUPAT.262
3.4.1.5 EUPOL COPPS 
To support the Palestinian Authority in taking respon-
sibility for law and order, and, in particular, in impro-
ving its civil police and law enforcement capacities the
EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support
Mission EUPOL COPPS began its operational phase in
January 2006.263 It was established in January 2005
in the context of the endorsement of a short-term
action programme on security, reforms, elections and
the economy in the Palestinian Territories. EUPOL COPPS
is not endowed with executive power, has duration of
three years, and aims to “contribute to the establish-
ment of sustainable and effective policing arrange-
ments under Palestinian ownership in accordance with
best international standards”.264 In detail this involves
assisting the Palestinian Civil Police (PCP) in the imple-
mentation of the Police Development Programme by
advising and mentoring Palestinian officials at head-
quarters and district level, advising Palestinian autho-
rities on police-related aspects of the criminal justice
system and coordinating and facilitating international
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assistance to the PCP.265 Being a small mission with a
moderate budget EUPOL COPPs is only able to address
the reform of a limited part of the Palestinian securi-
ty forces.266 “It nevertheless signifies the EU’s long term
engagement in the area and could perform a crucial
confidence building role”.267
As stated in the joint action, EUPOL COPPS will coope-
rate with the Community’s programmes for institution-
building as well as other international efforts in the
wider context of security sector reform. An assistance
programme launched by the Commission is included
within a broader proposal for a comprehensive, medium-
term EU strategy for Palestinian support, presented by
the European Commission to the Council and the Euro-
pean Parliament in October 2005.268 This strategy is
built on the European Neighbourhood Policy Action
Plan agreed between the EU and the PA in 2004.269
On account of the outcome of the Palestinian legislative
elections of early 2006 the mission has scaled down
its active involvement with the Palestinian Civil Police,
although it keeps contacts at working level.270
While many official EU sources and statements suggest
a general EU commitment to human rights activities in
any police advice and support project,271 once again
human rights are not referred to in this mission’s man-
date. A stronger reference would assist the mission’s
difficult task of raising human rights standards in the
Palestinian police forces.
3.4.2 Rule of Law Operations
Rule of law and human rights are inextricably intertwined.
The establishment of the rule of law is a pre-condition
for the implementation of human rights standards. Thus
any mission which helps to (re)establish a system of
rule of law in a country has a particular opportunity to
contribute to the protection and promotion of human
rights.
The EU’s first Rule of Law Mission EUJUST Themis, in
Georgia,272 was established on 16 July 2004 for one
year.273 In June 2004 the Georgian Prime Minister had
invited the EU to assist his government by way of such
an operation. The mission was “one of the numerous
EU/EC instruments used in Georgia and at the time a
test-case for future ESDP civilian operations”.274 Twen-
ty-eight staff were deployed to Georgia on the principle
of “colocation”, that is of sending international experts
to work in top management positions in the institutions
that form part of a justice system of a country under-
going transition or coming out of a conflict.275 In or-
der to assist in guiding the reform of the criminal jus-
tice sector “towards international and European human
rights standards by providing high level advice and also
through monitoring and mentoring activities”,276 ex-
perts were placed in the Georgian Ministry of Justice,
the Court of Appeal, the Ministry of the Interior, the po-
lice academy and the general prosecutors’ office, the
Council of Justice and the public defence office.277 A
number of recommendations elaborated with the assis-
tance of EUJUST Themis have been implemented and
helped Georgia on the way to judicial independence.278
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But Sylvie Pantz, the former Head of Mission, also
stated in 2005 after the mission had closed that she
“does not expect any immediate results from the work
of the mission”.279 She described the country as un-
stable and argued that there was no guarantee that
the government would continue implementing the re-
form.280 In order to ensure that the completed mission
was followed up, two rule-of-law experts were added
to the support team for the EUSR for the South Cauca-
sus region on border monitoring,281 and two Themis
experts were deployed in Tbilisi to accompany the plan-
ning of the implementation process.282
Overall Sylvie Pantz concluded that in her view the
EU’s rule of law missions are excellent instruments for
countries coming out of crisis to reform their criminal
justice system.283 However, Pantz also described a series
of lessons that had been learnt from EUJUST Themis –
ranging requirements for communication and coordi-
nation skills and substantial knowledge of the country
and its legal system to the need to ensure ownership by
the local partners. 
As well as these lessons, it has been observed that
although the Joint Action was clearly defined, the mis-
sion’s mandate was not flexible enough to accommo-
date unexpected situations and was too ambitious for
a one year deployment.284 Whether EUJUST Themis can
be considered a successful undertaking will depend on
the way the reform of the judicial system is eventually
implemented in Georgia.
After the Brussels European Council on 5 November 2004
had recognised the importance of strengthening the cri-
minal justice system in Iraq in compliance with respect
for human rights,285 the Union launched the Integrated
Rule of Law Mission in Iraq EUJUST LEX, on 1 July 2005.
The mission is mandated to provide training for high-
and mid-level officials in senior management and crimi-
nal investigation to improve the capacity of the diffe-
rent components of the Iraqi criminal justice system.286
It aims to “improve skills and procedures in criminal
investigation in full respect for the rule of law and hu-
man rights”.287 The programme thus includes “sound
training on the respect of human rights”.288
So far more than 800 Iraqi magistrates, senior policemen
and prison officers have been trained in an integrated
fashion in EU member states.289 Human rights represent
an imperative aspect in the mandate of this mission.
Capacity-building in this field and human rights edu-
cation are the essence of the operation. Nonetheless,
measured against the scale of the need, the impact of
EUJUST LEX remains uncertain, as the Iraqi criminal
justice system needs to be completely reconstructed.
The EU actions are certainly essential; they are however
neither sufficient nor sustainable.290 Despite the fact
that the Joint Action maintains that other long-term
Community programmes will follow, it remains unclear
how the short-term EUJUST LEX mission will be con-
nected to longer-term efforts to rebuild the Iraqi legal
system in order to contribute to the protection of human
rights in an exceptionally difficult security and politi-
cal situation. 
According to Michael Matthiessen, former Personal
Representative of the SG/HR on Human Rights in the
area of CFSP, a human rights point of contact has re-
cently been established for EUJUST LEX. The mission
mandate has been extended until December 2007.
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3.4.3 Border Assistance Missions
The EU’s first border assistance operation, the Mission
at Rafah Crossing Point on the Gaza-Egypt border, 
EU BAM Rafah, was deployed on 25 November 2005.291
The border point was opened to improve the economic
prospects of the Palestinian people and to allow them
to move more freely. The operation, which was origi-
nally intended to last 12 months, was launched to ac-
tively monitor and evaluate the Palestinian Authority’s
performance with regard to the implementation of the
Framework, Security and Customs Agreements con-
cluded between the parties on the operation of the
Rafah terminal. Furthermore it will contribute to build-
ing up the Palestinian capacity in all aspects of border
management at Rafah.292 The work at the Rafah cross-
ing point has improved tremendously since the deploy-
ment of the EU team.293 The former Head of Mission,
Pascal Schumacher, pointed out that for the mission
personnel it was not clear what kind of international
standards they should work with and where these stan-
dards are defined. EU BAM tried to work with the
Schengen standards.294 However, these were developed
to deal with the EU area, not the Middle East, which
raised problems on how to apply them there.295
In February 2006 Nicoletta Pirozzi from Isis Europe sta-
ted “for the time being, EU BAM Rafah can be conside-
red a success”.296 As the Rafah border crossing is the only
way out of Gaza to Egypt Palestinians were pleased with
the stabilisation of Rafah, “if only because they (we)re
passing freely through a border they can call their own”,
the Toronto Star reported in May 2006. The newspaper
quotes the Palestinian Haithem Shakreet: “I am happy
to see this crossing under proper security control.”
“Even with things as bad as they are, this is something
new for us. When Israelis controlled Rafah, you could
spend three or four days sitting on one side, waiting for
the border to open. Now, even though the security checks
are very tight, you can be confident you will get through
in a single day.” 
Due to the deterioration of the situation in Gaza in
June 2006, the terminal has been open only sporadi-
cally, and the number of people passing through the
border crossing has fallen dramatically since then.297 So
a number of factors will determine whether the mission
at Rafah will ultimately prove a success.
While the mandate does not refer specifically to human
rights, the contribution of the mission to a legally func-
tioning border certainly contributes to the freedom of
movement of Gaza’s inhabitants, a basic human right
enshrined in the ICCPR. The mission’s mandate was ex-
tended for 6 months on 13 November 2006.298
The EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and
Ukraine (EU BAM) was established by the EU in Novem-
ber 2005 at the joint request of the presidents of Mol-
dova and Ukraine, who called for additional EU support
in overall capacity-building for border management, in-
cluding customs, on the whole Moldova-Ukraine border. 
For two years 69 international experts and 50 local
staff will help to prevent smuggling, trafficking and
customs fraud through advice and training to improve
the border service.299 The aim is to build confidence
and strengthen cross-border co-operation and establish
a system of customs controls and border surveillance
which meets European standards. The mission aims to
reduce illicit cross-border flows, including of weapons,
drugs and trafficked human beings. The Mission is an
advisory, technical body, and thus, like the other assis-
tance missions, has no executive powers.300 The man-
date of the mission does not refer to human rights. Both
Moldova and Ukraine are part of the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy, and the human rights impact of the
mission needs to be evaluated in detail – the efforts to
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combat trafficking may represent a real contribution to
the protection of human rights of trafficked women, but
the question arises why a mission dealing with migration
issues does not have a human and refugee rights com-
ponent. 
3.4.4 The EU’s Monitoring Mission AMM
The EU Monitoring Mission in Aceh/Indonesia (AMM),301
established in September 2005,302 was the first real
ESDP monitoring operation, and the first ever EU ope-
ration in Asia. According to Amnesty International the
AMM was a “historic opportunity to ensure that viola-
tions of human rights and humanitarian law in the pro-
vince are brought to an end”.303 The mission’s activities
have paved the way to sustainable peace in Aceh, where
a peace agreement was announced on 17 July 2005
between the government of Indonesia and the GAM,304
and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) formally
signed on 15 August.305 The only lead actor for monito-
ring implementation of the MoU that both parties
would accept was the EU, which subsequently set up
AMM at the request of both parties. The mission, con-
ducted in co-operation with five ASEAN countries,306
was initially due to expire after six months on 15 March
2006, but was extended until mid-December.307 Accor-
ding to the International Crisis Group, a large part of
the population of Aceh was happy to see the AMM ex-
tended due to its generally strong performance.308
The objective of AMM was to assist the government
of Indonesia and the GAM in their implementation of
the MoU. Under the terms of the MoU AMM was tasked
with monitoring the human rights situation and provi-
ding assistance in this field. Monitoring focused on the
demobilisation of GAM, on decommissioning and on
the reintegration of active GAM members. The AMM
monitored the re-location of non-organic military forces
and police troops and the process of legislative change
which encompassed the review of the legal code for
Aceh and the setting up of an independent court system,
including a court of appeals. Furthermore, the mission
had the duty to rule on disputed amnesty cases, and
dealt with alleged violations of the MoU.309 The moni-
toring of human rights violations was, however, limited
to violations that took place after the adoption of the
MoU on 15 August 2005.310 So AMM was not manda-
ted to delve into the past and past violations of human
rights. In this respect the EU has been criticised for not
including transitional justice in AMM’s mandate.311
A further objective lay in the strengthening of civil so-
ciety groups and national institutions in the field of
human rights with the intention of facilitating the im-
plementation of civil and political as well as economic,
social and cultural rights. Their implementation was,
according to Pieter Feith, Head of AMM, directly related
“to the reintegration effort and the future of Aceh”.312
The mission thus explicitly had human rights in its
mandate in the sense of a monitoring function.313 Hu-
man rights are also mentioned in the MoU in Article 5.2d
as the basis of the Law on Governing Aceh, in Article 2
on human rights, and Article 4.12 on special training
with an emphasis on human rights for organic police.
It is significant that according to the MoU the govern-
ment of Indonesia agreed to adhere to the UNICCPR
and ICESCR.314 The MoU made it a condition that Indo-
nesia had to sign the ICCPR and ICESCR, which was a
significant and innovative move that could be used as
an example for other missions. As flanking measures to
secure human rights protection and the rule of law in
the long term, the EU Commission supports the estab-
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lishment of the Human Rights Court and a Commission
for Truth and Reconciliation for Aceh.315 It is also note-
worthy that subsequent to signing of the MoU and prior
to launching the mission in Aceh the SG/HR Personal
Representative for Human Rights was consulted to give
advice on the human rights aspects of the mission, the
first time this has been done in an ESDP operations.316
It was also the very first time that the EU has sent human
rights monitors in the context of a crisis management
operation, and the first time that such a mission had a
deputy head of mission for amnesty, reintegration & hu-
man rights.317 In general, the execution of human rights
tasks was coordinated by a human rights coordinator.
But the mission also had a reintegration advisor and
reintegration officer to coordinate reintegration issues,
which fall mostly under economic, social, and cultural
rights.318 Referring to all these newly introduced mea-
sures, Pieter Feith said that “AMM is breaking new
ground for future ESDP missions and we like to think it
will change the way the EU conducts crisis manage-
ment operations”.319 We can only speculate whether
this change will actually occur, but that the way in which
the AMM mission was conducted was successful has
been confirmed a number of times. The Acehnese them-
selves, as reported by the International Crisis Group,
believe that the EU Mission in Aceh has played an im-
portant role in reinforcing peace.320 They are impressed
“with AMM’s achievements in building dialogue bet-
ween government representatives and those they were
fighting 18 months ago”, said Lucy Williamson from
the BBC in Jakarta in December 2006.321
As regards the mission’s success in improving the human
rights situation, the former Spokesperson for AMM,
stressed: 
“Although human rights are not to be measured easi-
ly in quantity or even quality-protection, promotion
and promulgation can be monitored. In the specific case
of Aceh we have seen a drastic improvement of human
rights practice from the onset of the peace process”.322
This extremely encouraging evaluation of AMM will
unquestionably strengthen the former HR/SG Personal
Representative’s view that future crisis management
operations should include: “human rights related as-
pects from the very beginning, and where appropriate
also as part of preparatory fact finding missions, to en-
sure that human rights issues are adequately covered
and addressed during and following such operations”.323
3.4.5 Missions to Come – Kosovo and Afghanistan
On 10 April 2006 the EU decided to place a planning
team in Kosovo (EUPT Kosovo) aiming at preparing for
a new ESDP mission in Kosovo and ensuring a smooth
transition between this possible EU crisis management
operation in the field of rule of law and other areas
and selected tasks of the United Nations Interim Ad-
ministration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The Council
decided in December 2006 to reinforce and extend the
planning team’s mandate until May 2007.324 After a re-
quest by NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
for the EU to build up the police force in Afghanistan, the
EU recently sent a fact-finding mission to Afghanistan
in order to examine the conditions for a potential civilian
ESDP mission in the field of policing with linkages to
the wider rule of law. EU Foreign Ministers will now con-
sider options for the future of the overall EU engage-
ment, taking into account the mission’s findings. Given
the notorious human rights record in both crisis regions,
both missions would certainly benefit from a strong
human rights mandate.
3.5 Human Rights Components within
EU Operations – Summing Up
To sum up, since the Göteburg European Council, the EU
has successfully launched 16 operations: three mili-
tary ones (Concordia, Althea, Artemis) plus the most
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recent one in Kinshasa (EUFOR DRC), one Security Sec-
tor Reform Mission (EUSEC DRC), five Police operations
(EUPM, Proxima, EUPOL Kinshasa, EUPOL COPPS, EUPAT),
two Rule of Law Missions (EUJUST Themis, EUJUST LEX),
an Action to support the African Union’s efforts in Dar-
fur, two Border Assistance Missions (EU BAM Rafah,
EU BAM Ukraine & Moldova) and one Monitoring Mis-
sion (AMM).
The Union’s military operations have certainly been able
to contribute to creating a more secure environment in
crisis regions which is a pre-condition to human rights
protection and to prevent further violations – be it
through the deterring effect of an international pre-
sence, by effective measures to put an end to impunity
of perpetrators of human rights violations, or by stabi-
lisation of the security situation, training of security
forces and protection of the civil population. The EUSEC
DR Congo mandate explicitly mentions that policies
shall be promoted compatible with and mission tasks
be carried out in full respect for human rights.
Regarding the civilian operations, only two of them –
EUJUST Lex and the Aceh Monitoring Mission – were
explicitly mandated to carry out human rights tasks.
However, both rule of law missions and nearly all po-
lice missions paid great attention to human rights pro-
tection. Proxima included a strong human rights com-
ponent in the form of the Law Enforcement Monitors,
even if they were not mentioned in the mandate, and
EUPOL Kinshasa included human rights training as one
of the major elements of police education.
Most of the human rights activities in ESDP crisis mana-
gement operations are short-term or flanking mea-
sures to secure human rights protection and the rule of
law, since most EU operations are rather short-term
instruments which cannot provide lasting solutions.
The human rights aspects within the missions and the
entire operations may, however, contribute to stability
for sustainable conflict prevention work to take root,
particularly if embedded in a long-term strategy invol-
ving other civilian actors including those employed by
the European Commission.
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4.1 Conclusions
Development of a human rights policy within ESDP is
still comparatively young. The enhancement of human
rights and gender mainstreaming and the improvement
of training and evaluation procedures for ESDP opera-
tions are work in progress. Respect for human rights,
which is a substantial objective of the CFSP and an
expression of the commitment of EU member states to
the normative foundations of the EU has by now en-
tered into many key documents on the ESDP.325 Almost
all of these incorporate references to human rights,
but in practice, as the survey of missions in chapter 3
shows, human rights have only been included to a limi-
ted extent. It seems that efforts to enhance human
rights in the sphere of ESDP missions are increasing,
though. Human rights and gender advisors have become
part of some missions. Human rights experts have opened
discussions with the civil-military cell and the military
staff on how to include human rights aspects in future
operations, and the integration of human rights edu-
cation into training of mission personnel is being dis-
cussed. An explicit and systematic approach to human
rights as an aim within the framework of ESDP, how-
ever, cannot yet be identified. The human rights main-
streaming guidelines have to be put into practice now,
and truly become a central guiding principle since hu-
man rights are a decisive factor in sustainable conflict
resolution and lasting and genuine peace.326
4.2 Recommendations 
1. Human Rights as a Strategic Element in the 
Design of Crisis Response
With civilian aspects of ESDP the EU has at its disposal
a range of instruments it could use for designing pro-
actively civilian intervention since these tools have
their own, underused potential for crisis response.327
“Today’s human rights violations are the causes of to-
morrow’s conflicts,” as the former High Commissioner
for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, said. Thus, it needs
to be ensured that all missions are embedded in a longer-
term conflict prevention strategy, including human
rights protection as a paramount instrument for non-
violent conflict resolution. 
The EU has not yet entered into the field of multidi-
mensional peace operations but, as the overview in
chapter 3 shows, has chosen an approach of identify-
ing strategic entry points for intervention, protection
and assistance in peace missions.328 Many EU missions
take place in an environment where many actors take
over specific tasks, with diverging degrees of coordi-
nation and cooperation. But, whatever the EU decides
its own contribution within a crisis region should be,
human rights and a special awareness of women’s
rights, children’s rights and the rights of groups in vul-
nerable situations should be a key factor in the situa-
tion assessment, and protection and promotion of hu-
man rights should be a key objective of the mandate
and the strategic design of a mission. The assessment
of the most appropriate tool may result in the estab-
lishment of a larger human rights component of a mis-
sion,329 or, at least, the integration of advisors on hu-
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man rights and/or gender. It may also result in a main-
streaming policy for the mission, mirrored in the com-
position of mission staff, in training for military and
civilian staff and in the mandate and objectives of the
mission.
Recommendation: The EU should stress the civilian
aspect of ESDP missions and use its potential for a pro-
active design of civilian intervention. Civilian operations
offer a range of valuable tools for sending a strong poli-
tical message of EU support for human rights and peace. 
The EU’s situation assessments of crisis situations where
a civil and/or military intervention is envisaged should
include a human rights analysis of the region. Man-
date and design of the missions should explicitly in-
corporate human rights protection and promotion in a
crisis region as a key objective for a lasting and sus-
tainable impact of a mission for peace and security.
2. Human Rights Components of EU Missions 
and Mandates
Human rights components of EU missions should be
endowed with a clear and strong mandate. The actual
formulation of human rights tasks in the mandates is
essential for the success of these tasks involving human
rights components that may range from observing hu-
man rights violations by conflicting parties and the
corresponding reporting, initiating or monitoring crimi-
nal proceedings to the setting up of human rights insti-
tutions. The mandate should relate to the relevant human
rights framework of the mission, in particular relevant
national law and international and regional human rights
treaties ratified by the host country. Effective human
rights monitoring and serious investigation of accusa-
tions also requires contact points for the civilian popu-
lation, provision of sufficient resources in terms of
trained personnel, and a reporting cycle that allows
observations to be channelled into investigations (and
criminal proceedings where appropriate) but also into
the setting up of human rights institutions.
Recommendation: Human rights components within
EU missions should be based on a strong and compre-
hensive mandate, which should establish clear reporting
lines for mission personnel to report observations of
human rights violations by the conflicting parties. The
mandates should furthermore clearly state the range of
tasks and responsibilities of the mission’s human rights
component, such as human rights monitoring and re-
porting, conduct of investigations, institution building
and capacity-building. Mission staff has to be appro-
priately trained for these specialised tasks. The EU
should, in addition, provide access for the local popu-
lation and ensure that legal or institutional conse-
quences are drawn from observations and reports. 
3. Human Rights Advisors
The establishment of Human Rights Focal Points (as
part of a brief e.g. of the legal advisor) in various mis-
sions and the intention to appoint (full time) Human
Rights Advisors in EU missions are excellent develop-
ments. Now that the first human rights posts have been
established in a number of missions these efforts will
contribute to deepened human rights awareness in EU
missions.
Recommendation: Every mission should include a gen-
der-sensitive full-time Human Rights Advisor at head-
quarters on the ground. As mentioned before, mandates
should clearly state the range of tasks of the human
rights advisors. The advisors should be adequately re-
sourced. They must be given appropriate competences
in order to integrate a human rights perspective into
the full range of ESDP activities. Adequate reporting
lines should ensure that the advisor has access to the
head of mission and a specialised human rights unit
(within the EU or at UN level). Special attention should
be paid to women’s rights especially where the mission
does not have a Gender Advisor. Responsibilities and
activities should include: 
Coordination and monitoring of human rights main-
streaming implementation in the mission
Collection of information on human rights aspects
of the local situation, reporting about the situation
Advice to the head of mission on human rights as-
pects of their work
Arrangement of regular meetings with local human
rights NGOs and the national human rights institution
Cooperation with other international actors in the
field on human rights issues (e.g. OSCE, UN, Council
of Europe)
Provision of a permanent contact point for the local
population in terms of all issues regarding human
rights. The local population should be informed about
the role of the human rights advisor. 
All mission personnel should be informed about the
functions of the human rights advisors.
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4. Gender Units
It is generally recognised that conflict affects women
and men differently. Each group has gender-specific
needs during and after conflict. Greater efforts should
now be made to implement the resolutions and guide-
lines on gender mainstreaming, and to include the dif-
ferentiated gender perspectives of women, girls, men
and boys into mission practices in order to ensure or at
least make it more likely that fundamental human
rights will be upheld.
Resolutions and documents such as UN Resolution
1325 and the “Council Conclusions on promoting gen-
der equality and gender mainstreaming in crisis mana-
gement” affirm that a gender perspective should be
fully integrated in the planning and conduct of all ESDP
missions and operations. The appointment of the first
Gender Advisor to an EU operation (EUFOR RD Congo)
is a very good development. However, as the gender
audit of the EU missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina has
indicated, the interests of women in mission areas have
been largely overlooked and thus an enormous amount
of work still needs to be done. 
Most countries of the world have ratified the UN Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion against Women. A Gender Unit should promote
the implementation of the convention in the host coun-
try of the mission including, where appropriate, of spe-
cial measures “aimed at accelerating the de facto equa-
lity between men and women” according to Art. 4.1 of
the convention. 
Recommendation: The “Council Conclusions on pro-
moting gender equality and gender mainstreaming in
crisis management”, the “Guidelines on the Protection
of Civilians” and the “Generic Standards of Behaviour”,
and, inter alia, their regulations against sexual exploi-
tation and prostitution, should be fully implemented
by all ESDP missions. A gender perspective should be
integrated already in the fact finding and the prepara-
tory work of the missions. A Gender Advisor or, at the
very least, a Focal Point for gender issues should be
established for all missions, with an adequate counter-
part in Brussels. It should be made clear to the local
population as well as all mission personnel that either
the respective Human Rights Advisor or a Gender Ad-
visor specifically appointed for the mission is the con-
tact point for all questions related to gender issues. 
Where not already in place, national measures, such
as action plans for the implementation of UN Security
Council Resolution 1325, should be prepared and imple-
mented by all EU member states contributing to peace
missions. 
5. Investigation of Accusations against Mission
Personnel
While the adoption of the “Generic Standards of Beha-
viour” and the “Guidelines on the Protection of Civilians”
are certainly a real step forward, both providing a nor-
mative framework for reference, they must now be im-
plemented. Although in theory they state that moni-
toring and reporting of alleged violations of human rights
and the investigation of each complaint and prosecu-
tion of the person concerned by the competent autho-
rity should be ensured,330 and that in the interest of
transparency, member states, third States and the EU
institutions should also report on disciplinary actions
taken, as appropriate,331 in fact publicly accessible in-
formation on numbers and types of individual cases is
not available.
The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms grants in Art. 1 the
rights and freedoms enshrined in the Convention to all
persons within the jurisdiction of their High Contracting
Parties. This situation may apply to EU missions. In this
case the local population even has the right to an effec-
tive remedy in case of violations of their rights. In any
case, the local population must be informed of official
contact points in case of any alleged violation of the
rights by the mission personnel. 
Recommendation: The EU should work for detailed
regulations for dealing with allegations of violations
by EU mission personnel – valid for all sending states –
to be drafted at the Council of the EU. A mission needs
to ensure the establishment and public announcement
of a contact point for the local population in case of a
complaint against mission personnel. Accusations of
violations of international humanitarian law or human
rights provisions by EU armed forces, EU police units or
civilian EU mission personnel must be answered by
thorough and independent investigations by the sen-
ding country and, if applicable, criminal prosecution.
The EU should be informed of the outcome of these
investigations. 
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6. Evaluation of EU Missions
Internal evaluation of ESDP missions is justifiably hard-
ly accessible to the public. The same is true for “lessons
learnt” reports written for each mission, albeit in an
informal process. According to the former Personal
Representative for Human Rights this modus operandi
has been chosen to ensure a frank and honest and thus
useful and effective evaluation in order to better plan
future missions.332
However, with the gender audit of the EU missions in
Bosnia-Herzegovina the European Council has taken
the innovative step of commissioning an external evalu-
ation on the human rights impact of a mission. While
parliamentary control of ESDP missions certainly needs
to be strengthened, expert analysis on the part of aca-
demic institutions and civil society is highly desirable
as well. To ensure accountability and transparency of
ESDP missions, evaluations will have to be initiated
and mission reports made publicly available. UN mission
reports (admittedly of varying quality) appear regularly
on UN mission websites. The human rights aspects of
some UN missions have been evaluated – often in coope-
ration between mission staff, academic institutions,
competent NGOs and UN headquarters staff. Reports of
evaluation seminars of UN human rights components
constitute an extremely valuable tool for learning and
a basis for conclusions for future missions.333
Recommendation: The EU should evaluate EU missions
with respect to their human rights impact so as to enable
all those involved to draw on lessons learnt for future
operations. In addition, the degree to which the hu-
man rights mainstreaming approach and objectives
have been integrated into all policies and activities of
each peace support operation should be taken into ac-
count. External end-of-mission evaluations should be
commissioned, examining in particular the human rights
impact of the missions on the local population. Results
should not only be made available to the European
Parliament but also to the interested public for broader
discussion. 
EU mission websites should publish updates on the
work of the missions.
7. Training
Human rights training for ESDP is, all in all, at an early
stage. This is true for all main training institutions: the
European Security and Defence College (ESDC), the Eu-
ropean Police College (CEPOL) and the EC Project on
Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. At
present, some individual member states do integrate
human rights elements into their training for military
and civil mission staff, with differing priorities. Human
rights play a marginal role, though, in the orientation
and high level courses of the ESDC.
While the Council Secretariat does play a role in ESDP
training concepts, it is in the first place up to individual
member states to set new priorities within ESDP trai-
ning and thus to promote a stronger human rights
agenda for ESDC and other EU training for ESDP mis-
sions. Discussions on the integration of human rights
on different levels should be taken forward by member
states who want to see an ESDP that does justice to EU
human rights obligations and commitments. With the
“Generic Standards of Behaviour” and the “Guidelines
for the Protection of Civilians” the EU has prepared
two very important basic documents that now need to
be appropriately integrated in training practice. Training
should also deepen awareness of gender-sensitive rela-
tions with the civilian population and deepen knowledge
on anti-discrimination measures.
In any case, coherence, co-ordination and consistent
standards among all training actors is an absolute ne-
cessity since quality differences in the training of per-
sonnel can have a negative effect on the quality of
missions. 
Recommendation: EU member states in cooperation
with the EU council should work for human rights ele-
ments to be integrated in the orientation and the high-
level courses run by the European Security and Defence
College and ensure human rights training for mission
staff in the preparation for every mission. Central train-
ing components in this respect are basic knowledge of
international and regional human rights protection,
practical fact-finding, monitoring and reporting of hu-
man rights violations, and the application of standards
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of behaviour within the mission and towards the civi-
lian population. Training should also deepen aware-
ness of gender-sensitive relations with the civilian
population and teach knowledge relating to anti-dis-
crimination measures.
Lessons learnt should be included in the training. 
8. Civil Society
According to Hadewych Hazelzet,334 NGOs have been
actively involved in promoting human rights aspects
in ESDP operations – they were operational for develop-
ments such as the shaping of guidelines on children
and armed conflict and human rights defenders. And
they have, for example, played an invaluable role in
the disarmament, demobilisation and rehabilitation
programmes in DRC in cooperation with operation
Artemis. However, the authors of the study on gender
mainstreaming in ESDP Missions came to the conclusion
that at least in Bosnia and Herzegovina the EU only
seemed to work with government officials and politi-
cians during its missions, not with local grass-root or-
ganisations.335
The EU has identified this lack of systematic co-ope-
ration as a weakness and developed recommendations
for enhanced cooperation with NGOs and civil society
with the purpose of enhancing the operational efficien-
cy of the ESDP.336 Recommendations range from regular
informal exchanges between NGOs and Council bodies
such as the PSC and CIVCOM, the use of NGO expertise
for fact-finding or planning missions and NGO liaison
in mission, through to exchanges of views on lessons
learnt. An invitation to NGOs for cooperation with the
mission would be extremely valuable to ensure sus-
tainability of any mission since local NGOs play a key
role with respect to human rights once the operation
reaches its closing stage and leaves the host country. 
Recommendation: The EU should ensure proper con-
sultation and regular dialogue with international, natio-
nal and local human rights NGOs during the entire time
of a mission from the planning phase to the lessons
learnt processes. This may even require the integration
of a civil society expert into the mission. NGOs should be
invited to take part in the capacity-building activities
of missions. Human rights information from reliable
local and national NGOs should be evaluated and ac-
tively drawn on by peace missions.
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